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Abstract
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new Cuba has become even clearer with the recent transfer of power to Raul Castro.
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GUEST EDITOR

THE

FROM

The New Old Cuba
perspective suggests that Cuba is frozen in time, based on a view from the
top: a political system that has remained quite unchanged if not atrophied. But, if one looks deep into the
macro-structures of
power, one will find that things have dramatically changed among political institutions
and leaders outside the inner circle. Particularly at the grassroots level, these changes will have a decisive
impact on the island's future. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 15 years of the Special Period, and
significant demographic changes, there is a new Cuba emerging. This new Cuba has become clearer with the recent
s

news

there

a new

Cuba? The traditional

that Fidel Castro's illness has caused him

of newness

to

cede power

to

his brother, Raúl Castro.

We will

now see

the

con-

sharper.
Despite the dynamics of social change, the island of Cuba is often perceived to be suspended/outside real space and
time, beyond the parameters of global social life. Such a portrayal highlights the tendency to feature and magnify
Cuba's uniqueness. As this issue of Hemisphere reveals, transnational norms, capital, identities, and mass culture have
not stopped short of Cuban shores.
Moreover, within Cuban society, economics, and politics, significant sources of
change will perhaps play out in unexpected, but important ways.
In "Poverty and Inequality in Cuba," Lorena Barberia reveals that new trends in consumption, income generation,
and social mobility represent significant challenges for the egalitarianism embraced by Cuban leaders for nearly half a
century. Without a critical reassessment of social policy, Barberia maintains, the stratification of society will continue
to widen the gap between Cubans with and without access to remittances and sectors of the economy driven by for
eign direct investment.
In examining the Cuban-Venezuelan relationship, Javier Corrales writes that while the island's alliance with its
South American neighbor offers enormous material benefits without the obligation to modify domestic policies,
Cuba will eventually pay the price for its new dependence, just as the country paid for its dependence on the former
tours

even

Soviet Union.
In "Cuba and
economy.

China,"

how China represents a new lifeline for the island's
relations with China as an example of social solidarity, the two countries

Dan Erikson and Adam Minson

Yet, while Cuban leaders perceive

explore

separated by an increasing ideological divide regarding the benefits of economic liberalization.
The increasing ideological divide, however, transcends elite politics and foreign affairs. In "The New Politics of
Opposition," Orlando Gutiérrez-Boronat analyzes changes in the island's dissident movement, and concludes that a
resurgent sense of citizen solidarity noted among some sectors of Cuban society may indicate that a new phase in the
struggle for nonviolent change has begun.
A nuanced view of everyday resistance and accommodation is offered by Katrin Hansing in "Changes from Below."
Hansing reflects on the transformations experienced by all levels of Cuban society since the Special Period. By seek
ing new ways of connecting to the outside world and creating alternative spaces, Cubans are increasingly demonstrat
ing an independent attitude that may prove to be one of the greatest challenges faced by the state.
Another continuing challenge for state leaders is Cuba's economy. In "The End Rationing?," Carmelo Mesa-Lago
explores the inception and evolution of rationing, and assesses the feasibility of five strategies to fulfill Castro's prom
ise made in November 2005 that the island's 43-year old rationing system would soon be terminated. Mesa-Lago
concludes that this promise may be yet another symbolic ingredient of the official discourse designed to assure
Cubans that a bright future lies ahead.
Whether that future is bright or cloudy, will depend in part on the role of the armed forces-arguably the
strongest institution on the island-and the subtle transformations taking place deep in ranks of the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias. In "Young Blood," Frank Mora examines whether the armed forces are an agent of change
or
continuity. In the meantime, we will continue to see the contours of a new old Cuba emerge ever so clearly.
are
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From Below

Changes
by Katrin Hansing

world's

the

social

streets

Havana,

iad

of
is

one

immediately
struck by a myr
of contradictory images,

sounds, and sensations. Five-star
hotels, fancy cafés, bars and shops
offering imported foods, modern
appliances, mountain bikes, and

perfumes from Paris stand side by
side dilapidated and decaying
apartment blocks, empty peso
shops, and local bodegas, where

Cubans

can

be

seen

standing

in

overcrowded

guaguas, camellos, and particulares
(different types of local public

transport). Churches,

new

and

consumer

ticularly in the past decade, Cuba
has experienced fundamental and
enormous
changes on all levels of
society. In this article I will reflect
of these transformations

on some

and their consequences, particular
ly those that have and continue to
occur at

the grassroots social level.
am

and Dalia is

waiting

for Carlos,

vendor,

to

pick

a

up her

made croquetas. Over the past few
months, Dalia has stayed up every

become initiated.

and could

not

Although

Havana is

Cuba, these contradictions

are

emblematic of many of the changes
the island is currently undergoing.
Cuba is

island,

no

cut

Hemisphere

longer

the isolated

off from the

Volume 17

rest

of the

rency.

"We need

to

her
she

to

leave

profession. "I had no choice,"
says, "I only earned 280 pesos
not

that wage.
I now make croquetas but at least
we can
get b y.

daughter,

and

feed my mother,

myself on

"

Juan,

an

accomplished

geon, who has served
on

to

neurosur

as a

doctor

several internationalist missions
Africa, has a different yet similar

situation: He

vide for his

can no

family

longer

of five

pro

on

his

monthly peso income. Having
earned the right to buy a car after
his first mission

to

Zambia, Juan,

like many other Cubans who are
lucky enough to own a car, has
become a taxi driver. Due to the

live. I don't like work

ing illegally but the state has liter
ally pushed me into being dishon"

est.

Cuba's economic crisis

the

over

past 15 years has brought about
tremendous social and economic

changes, which,

increase in

meager income and had

bars.

will pay in hard cur
"What can I do? ," he asks.

eigners, who

Cuban state-owned company.

enjoyed her work,
longer survive on her

for

potential clients, preferably

vertible

habaneros

religions have become so
popular that many foreigners are
now
flocking to the island to

or

for

during the day.
Dalia is an accountant by training
and until recently worked for a
hungry

Cuban

pools

theless drives his old Lada around
town every day and night looking

tors,

no

Cuban nouveau
riche class can be seen lounging
around one of the five-star hotel

high cost and difficulties in acq uir
ing a taxi license, Juan, however,
works illegally. Despite the risks of
a
high fine if caught, Juan never

around 200 cheese,
fish, and/or chicken croquetas,
which Carlos then tries to sell to

night making

she could

newly emerging

street

freshly

she

while tourists and members of the

anxiously

local

Although

In many of the

culture.

and par

Special Period,

Since the

old, Catholic, Protestant, and espe
cially Pentecostal are being rebuilt,
restored, and revived, while Afro

city's tourist areas more and more
people, especially the elderly and
children, can be seen begging for
money, clothes, toiletries, or just
asking for chicle (chewing gum),

4

influences, and

It is 9

long lines waiting for their month
ly food rations. Flashy Mercedes
Benz, Toyota, and funny egg
shaped taxis bustle through the
streets next to

political, economic and
events, popular cultural

alking through

among other fac

include: the

legalization and
increasing dependence on the US$
dollar

(now

peso);

opening
tors

such

nation

CUC

or

the

Cuban

official

partial

of certain economic

tourism;

as

a

a

sec

major

living expenses
of people's salaries;

mation of

but stag
the for

double economy; the

increasing dependence
tances

con

on

and formation of

classes; the demise

remit

new

social

in the

quality of
continuing

social services; and the
control and repression of any inde

pendent activity
which

was

most

and

thought,
visibly witnessed

in the March 2003 crackdown of

75 dissidents.
As the examples of Dalia and

Juan show,

these

changes

have

not

only altered Cubans' lives in very
practical, everyday kinds of ways,
but also provoked major changes in
people's attitudes and actions
toward their lives, their futures,
and the state.
Before the economic crisis, most
Cubans relied

on

the government

Reports

New spaces,

attitudes, and actions in
contemporary Cuba
many still had faith

and, arguably,

in the system. The

stagnating econ
health care
omy, eroding quality of
and education, growing corrup
tion, and continuing repressive
government policies have led more
and more people to no longer
count on the/state to help them
solve their problems. Weariness,
skepticism, and distrust have
instead kicked in, forcing many
people to look for alternatives.
Although apathy, depression, and
leaving the country are some of the
drastic and dramatic meas
people have resorted to, many,

more

ures

if

not most

by creating
own

spaces,

Cubans
and

are

responding

carving

their

out

networks, and mecha

nisms-whether economic, social,
or cultural in nature-independ

ently

from the

state.

Like every Sunday morning, the
Salvación Pentecostal Church's 11
am service in
Boyeros, on the out

skirts of central Havana, is
Most congregants have

attended

Sunday

packed.
already

school

or

Bible

study classes since 9 am and many
will spend the rest of the day on
the church grounds taking part in
of the many recreational activi
ties or meals offered by the church.
one

"The church has become my sec
ond home," says María, who has
been a member of the congregation
for three years. "I
almost
other

every

to eat, to see

ofSanta Clara, Cuba. Cubans have
found creative ways to survive the economic hardships that afflict the island and,
in so doing, are fostering a growing sense of indep eden ce and self-reliance.
man

drives

a

bicycle-taxi through

the

streets

here

Sometimes
my friends, watch a

film, and of course

A

come

day.
to

pray."

In

search of community, food, medi
cine, and entertainment, but also
to fill their spiritual void, more and
more Cubans, like María, are seek

ing

out

religious

communities.

Whether Catholic, Protestant,

Hemisphere
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at a street corner

faith-based

people talking

organizations have
turned into important alternative
spaces of spiritual refuge and social
upliftment, as well as material sup
port based

on

self aid and solidari

fee, when
program

stall

standing
having a cof

I overheard

about

the

on

was

group of

a

a

special

current

situation in

Venezuela. I assumed that
were

reference

making

redonda session,

to

daily

a

news

they

the

news

mesa

pro

Cuban television, when I
gram
suddenly realized that they were in
on

ty.

illegal, people have
to be very creative in outwitting the
system and must constantly be on
their toes not to be caught. These
so are

are

deemed

skills that

can

and should

not

be underestimated, let alone the
energy and determination that go
into them. Moreover, these activi
ties

are

acts

of defiance-defiance

be like Comrade Che, many
have a strong craving to be them

about the program, I learned that a
certain individual in the neighbor

against a system that prohibits peo
ple from making an honest, decent
living. And that takes courage.
In short, a qualitative difference
in the way many people think and
act has emerged and is growing
more and more each
day. Despite

selves. There is among many

hood has

the crackdowns

Increasing numbers of Cuban
youth, which make up more than
half of the island's current popula
tion, are also searching for alterna
tives. Despite having been brought
to

up

growing

a

of wanting to be dif
curiosity about differ

sense

ferent and

a

lifestyles and values; in short, a
desire for options. One of the
more visible
signs of this is the
growing presence of a number of
both older and newer youth cul
tures, which include expressions
such as the hippie, freakie, roquero,
ent

rapero,

as

well

as

Rastafari

move

Through their alternative
lifestyles, body cultures, and out
ments.

looks

on

life, these subcultures

fact

about

talking

program that
Miami's Channel

a

had been aired on
51, which all of them had watched.
When I asked

a

one

of the

cable TV

antenna to

which about three dozen
households

are

men

or more

connected. Each

individual household pays the
owner of the antenna $5 a month,
which

helps

him make

while the others get

sought

out

las, and

to

living,
watch highly
a

foreign movies,

news

telenove

programs.

Although highly illegal and thus
very risky, activities such as con
necting to cable television and the
internet are becoming more and
more common.
Besides offering

offer many young

different types of

bility to
they are

tion, and entertainment, these

These
of the

people the possi
question and explore who
and what they want.
examples represent some

more

institutionalized

or

semiorganized forms in which peo
ple are searching for and finding
alternative
the official
tem.

and spaces to
rhetoric and sys

answers

state

The search for

news,

infor

mation, and

knowledge beyond
that provided by the state has
become particularly important.
While contact with family mem
bers abroad, interacting with for
eigners, involvement in grassroots
organizations, and listening to
among the more
established forms of doing so,
Radio MartÍ

are

increasing numbers of individuals
are
finding new ways of connecting
to

6

A few months ago I

Pentecostal, Afro-Cuban, Jewish,
Buddhist, Hindu, Masonic, or
Muslim, many of these and other

the outside world.

Hemisphere
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media allow

news,

people

informa

to connect

with

the outside world and, in so doing,
experience a completely different

reality,

however

momentarily.
So what do these examples show
us? For one, they demonstrate how
more and more
people are carving
out and
creating alternative spaces
and parallel mechanisms to the
state.
In so doing, they are acting
independently. This not only shows
that many are taking initiatives but
also responsibility for themselves
i.e., people are taking their own
lives into their own hands, which,
after decades of depending on a

cradle-to-grave

system, is

a

huge

step.
Given that many of the activities
and mechanisms involved in doing

on

dissidents and

Project, as well as the
continuing everyday repression and
restrictions people live under, many
no longer are afraid to speak their
the Varela

mind among each other, engage in
illicit activities, or find new and
creative ways of
spaces. It is this

tude and its

forging their own
independent atti
accompanying actions

that I would argue are among the
most important social changes that
have occurred

on

the island in the

last 10 years. Cubans may not yet
be turning to the streets to express
their frustrations and discontent,
but it is this newfound and

independence
may

just

greatest

growing

among many that

turn out to

challenges

to

be

one

the

of the

state.

II

Hansing is currently director
of a research project on Cuba's social
collaboration ties to Africa, based at
the University of Bayreuth in
Germany and funded by the German

Katrin

Research Council. She has worked as
a consultant for think tanks and poli
cy institutes on
ed issues and is

numerous

an

Cuba-relat

associate fellow

the Cuban Research Institute
Florida International

at

University.
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The New Politics of Opposition
by

Orlando Gutiérrez-Boronat

n

July 26,

2005,

ment

a

closed

gathering of
hand-picked follow
Half of his two-hour speech
ers.
was dedicated to attacking an inter
nal pro-democracy movement which
door

he described

as an

"illusion," orches

Revolution, he promised, "will

not

millimeter of ground"

a

these individuals. The

streets

to

belong

the Revolution and will stay that
way, he concluded. In the caval
to

cade of violence

following these
words, government-organized mobs
the island heckled, spit upon,
and sometimes even beat peaceful
dissidents outside their homes.
across

Some observers claim

to

be per

plexed by Castro's recurrence to
street violence against a pro-democ
racy movement that they do not see
as a

serious threat

regime's 47-year

the communist

to

old hold

on

power.

them.

Castro

The international

recognized

community

has

Cuban dissident leaders

as

Marta Beatriz

Biscet, Gustavo Arcos, and Elizardo
Sánchez Santacruz, offering them
known

men

and

women,

however,

"body" of the
Cuban opposition. The pillars of
civil resistance to the Castro regime
lie deep within the island's popula
tion, spread out across the provinces:
among disaffected youth and blacks,
do

not

constitute the

Catholics and Protestants, and,
increasingly, former Communists
disenchanted with the
tion of economic and
reform. In 1997, the

regime's rejec
political
Steps to

Freedom report counted 44 civic
resistance actions across the island;
in

2004, the number

was

1,805.

Intensely active, fueled by rising
social discontent and increased inter
national support from abroad, the

that the government has repeatedly
pronounced dead demonstrates the

Cuban civic

movement

itself is

mobilizing protests

the government. Berta's
brother, Jorge Luis Garda Pérez

against

Oscar Elías

Roque,

family

from Placetas, Villa Clara, are exam
pIes of the role played by provincial
dissidents in

the Ladies in White,
Oswaldo Payá, Vladimiro Roca,
such

in the 1960s.

regime

Berta Antúnez and her

Others argue that Castro's resort to
public violence against a movement

a

"Antúnez," has been imprisoned

speaking out in favor
of glasnost and perestroika. His tena
cious struggle from behind bars has
since 1990 for

turned him into

an

icon of the pro

democracy movement and a leader
of the political prisoners. Berta's
uncle, Omar Pernet, is also in jail,
of the 75 civic activists arrested
in March 2003.
one

Berta has

organized family mem
bers of political prisoners in the
provinces to support their impris
oned relatives. They have published
and circulated newsletters, carried
out sit-ins in front of prisons, held

weekly prayer vigils, and collected
signatures for the Varela Project ref
erendum drive.
Berta has

paid

a

high price

activities. In addition

longed

for her

the pro
incarceration of her brother
to

patchwork of individuals, families,
groups, and religious denominations

and uncle, Berta's

The Cuban case is perhaps best
understood in the context of the

regions and sectors
where opposition to Castroism has
traditionally been high.

school and barred from further pur
suing her education. Government

dynamics of nonviolent, grassroots
social struggle. Throughout history,

Year after year, a greater percent
age of actions occur outside Havana.

outside the

lone dissidents manage

resiliency of Cuba's embryonic

spreading

OppOSItiOn.

across

2004, 81.5% of civic

to

coalesce

In

into

increasingly effective

commit

activities took

tees,

coalitions, and

movements.

These articulated channels of social
power reshape civil society, which, in
turn,

platform for sus
ultimately successful civic

becomes the

tained and

defiance. Cuban dissidents
this

8

stopping

honors and awards. These well

trated from abroad. The
concede

on

A Patchwork of Unrest

Fidel Castro
addressed

is bent

path,

are on

and the Cuban govern-

Hemisphere
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place

resistance

in the

country's

Of the 75 civic leaders
arrested in March 2003, 43 were

interior.

from the

provinces. After Havana,
the provinces with the highest level
of activity were Villa Clara and
Matanzas, the sites of deep-rooted
campesino rebellions against the

Damaris, has

organized

daughter,
been expelled from

mobs have demonstrated

family's home.
The Sigler family in Matanzas
province is another example of a
nucleus of democratic resistance. Of
Gloria

Sigler's

prison and

four

one

sons, two are

in

is in exile.

Party officials have ran
sacked the Siglers' house and Gloria
herself, a frail 76-year-old, was
Communist

hurled
own

to

the floor and beaten in her

home

by government thugs.

Reports

Civil resistance

A group

of Cuban

demonstrators
board who

were

marching to

attempting

to

are

harassed

aggression hasn't deterred the
Siglers from carrying on with their
activities. They have organized pub
lic demonstrations, set up independ
ent libraries, and collected signatures
for the Varela Project's referendum
drive. Their defiance of the regime
in Matanzas has turned them into

opposition

It is difficult

to

regime

reach Florida.

This

national

the Castro

by pro-government thugs during a march in Havana on July 13) 2005. The
commemorate the anniversary of the sinking by the Cuban Navy of a tug with 43 people on

demonstrators

were

to

leaders.

or

as

Sánchez Santacruz, estimate that
there may be 5, 000 activists across

the island. Oswaldo

Payá

describing the movement
thousand strong."

agrees,
as

"several

In 200 1, the Cuban Democratic

Directorate,

calculate how

many dissidents like the Antúnez
Sigler families are active in the

provinces. Some observers, such
human rights activist Elizardo

together with

the

University of Miami's Cuba
Transition Project, conducted a cen
sus of the internal opposition in

Cuba.

Working closely with activists

inside the island, it counted 283 dis
sident groups. Of these, 86 are inde

pendent libraries, 29 are independent
press agencies, 107 are groups
engaged directly in some type of
political activity, and 61 are labor
groups, think tanks or civic institu
tions. The census further showed

type of dissident organiza
tion exists in all of the island's major
cities, all of its provinces, and in
that

some

Hemisphere
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pened, change will be inevitable.
Many analysts have pointed out that
this may not be the case, given
ambitious plans implemented by the
dictatorship to guarantee totalitarian
continuity. The listlessness caused
by the waiting game over Castro's
death hurts the dissidents in their

efforts

to

mobilize citizen

tion in social

change.

this

the

do

problem,

more to

reach

To

participa
overcome

movement must
out

with the basic social

and

connect

grievances

and

aspirations of Cubans on the street.
"Our hope does not lie in the bio
logical finality of anyone man, but
in the fact that we are struggling,"
Oswaldo Payá has said.
Something of this sort may have
already begun. As acts of sanctioned
violence against dissidents have esca
lated, their neighbors have come out
Members

of the

Cuban dissident group) Ladies in White) walk through Havana
on March 18) 2006, to
protest against the government and demand amnesty for
imprisoned dissidents. Despite the international recognition that the group and

other Cuban dissidents have attained, the pillars of the Cuban
found within the disafficted segments of the island's population.

most

crackdown doomed the

forced into

a tense

attempts at
EU's Lomé Accord, which would
have meant millions of dollars in

the internal

pro-democracy move
regime has tried to bal

municipalities.
Strategy and Prospects
The Castro dictatorship

ment.
ance

The

its need

content

to

has been

tug of war with

with its desire

grow closer
the United States
to

Union.

Dissidents have used the latitude

by this juggling act to reach
out to the general population.
The regime has proven adept at
blocking the growth of the pro
democracy movement at critical
junctures, but it has paid a high
political cost for doing so. The
1996 repression of the Concilio
Cubano meeting and the murder of
the Brothers to the Rescue pilots
afforded

resulted in the enactment of the
Helms-Burton bill. The 2003
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are

regime's
incorporation into the

repress social dis

economically to
and the European

10

opposition

loans and credits. However, some
informed observers, such as author
and

journalist

argued

really care about normalizing
political and economic ties with the
United States and the European
Union because of the possible politi
cal consequences. In this totalitarian
political scenario, the pro-democracy

holds out the potential
alternative democratic future

movement

for Cubans.

adversely affecting the
development of the movement is the
widespread perception, inside and
outside the island, that change will
not take place until Fidel Castro's
death, and that once this has hapA factor

defend them.

proud that no one
from her neighborhood participated
in the demonstrations against her
family. "They had to bring them in
from the outside, people who didn't
know us," she says smiling.
Berta Antúnez is

On his way to his version of cul
tural revolution, Castro may have
stumbled upon a resurgent sense of

solidarity in Cuba. It may
mark a new phase in the struggle for
nonviolent change on the island. II
citizen

that Castro

doesn't

an

to

Carlos Alberto

Montaner, have

for

of their homes

Orlando Gutiérrez-Boronat teaches
courses

in

political science

and

international studies at Florida
International University and Barry

University. He is cofounder and
National Secretary of the Cuban
Democratic Directorate (Directorio
Democrático Cubano), and the
author of La República Invisible
(((The Invisible Republic"), a book
long collection of essays on Cuban
national identity, exile politics) and
the civic

movement on

the island
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A

comprehensive analysis of corruption

in Cuba and

prescriptions

for

minimizing

it in the

post-Castro
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longtime grip on Cuba, revolutionary scholars and policy analysts have turned their
attention to life after Castro. Among the many questions to be answered is how the new government will deal with the
corruption that has become endemic in Cuba. While combating corruption cannot be the central aim of post-Castro pol
icy, Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Jorge Pérez-López suggest that, without a strong plan to thwart it, corruption will under
mine the new economy, erode support for the new government, and encourage organized crime. In short, unless meas
ures are taken to stem corruption, the new Cuba could be as messy as the old Cuba.
Fidel Castro did not bring corruption to Cuba; he merely institutionalized it. Official corruption has crippled Cuba since
the colonial period, but Castro's state-run monopolies, cronyism, and lack of accountability have made Cuba one of the
world's most corrupt states. The former communist countries in Eastern Europe were also extremely corrupt, and analy
ses of their transitional periods suggest that those who have taken measures to control corruption have had more suc
cessful transitions, regardless of whether the leadership tilted toward socialism or democracy. .To that end, Diaz-Briquets
and Pérez-López, both Cuban Americans, do not advocate any particular system for Cuba's néxt government, but instead
prescribe uniquely Cuban policies to minimized corruption whatever direction the country takes after Castro.
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Although Fidel

SERGIO

DíAZ-BRIQUETS

Alexandria, Virginia, which provides anticorruption advice
JORGE

PÉREZ-LÓPEZ

6

•

A collection of

x

to

Monitoring at the Fair Labor Association, a collaborative effort among companies,
universities to improve working conditions in factories around the world.

is Director of
and

society organizations,
October 2006

management consulting firm Casals and Associates in
governments and organizations throughout the world.

is Senior Vice President of the international

9 in., 272 pp.

original

essays

•

ISBN:

0-292-71482-3, $21.95, paperback. ISBN 0-292-71321-5, $55.00, hardcover

modern Latin American

on ten

civil

heroes, their legacies, and the societies that produced them

HEROES AND HERO CULTS IN LATIN AMERICA
EDITED BY SAMUEL BRUNK AND BEN FALLAW

history traditionally has been defined by larger-than-life heroes such as Simon Bolivar, Emiliano Zapata,
and Evita Perón. Recent scholarship, however, tends to emphasize social and cultural factors rather than great leaders.
In this new collection, Samuel Brunk and Ben Fallaw bring heroes back to the center of the debate, arguing that heroes
not only shape history, they also "tell us a great deal about the places from which they come."
The original essays in this collection examine ten modern Latin American heroes whose charisma derived from the qual
ity of their relationship with admirers, rather than their innate personal qualities. The rise of mass media, for instance,
helped pave the way for populists such as radio actress-turned-hero Evita Perón. On the other hand, heroes who become
president often watch their images crumble, as policies replace personality in the eye of citizens. In the end, the editors
national events. The
argue, there is no formula for Latin American heroes, who both forge, and are forged by, unique
enduring (or, in some cases, fading) influence of those discussed in this volume validates the central placement of heroes
in Latin American history.
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Cuba and China
by Daniel P.

Erikson and Adam Minson

uba's international
relations have changed
years, with old

alliances

patched

Venezuela in exchange
for 90,000 barrels per day of pref

Early

Important

economic

diplomatic relations
following Cuba's crackdown

dissidents in 2003. When
European embassies responded
inviting opposition leaders to

by

important embassy receptions,

the

Cuban government cut all contacts
with European ambassadors and
refused EU aid. Only days after an
official rapprochement was
announced in January 2005, Fidel

to

The

erentially-financed petroleum.

efforts of the two leaders to counter
US influence in the region have
ensured that simmering tension
with

.

on

Washington

anytIme

will

abate

not

soon.

of China

recent

however, China's stunning
ic

growth

and

years,

econom

increasing global

emerged

vant actor
an

panorama.
est

as an

in Latin

increasingly

important part of this
Beijing's renewed inter

in Cuba has

produced

hemispheric
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more

fre

high-level meetings, rapidly
expanding levels of economic coop
eration, and numerous exchanges
in the areas of science, technology,
and defense. Most critically for
quent

with China. In fact, Castro
became openly critical of Mao's

to

improve

in the

1980s,

as

the

Chinese and Soviet governments
inched closer to a détente and a

generation of leadership took
helm in Beijing.

new

the

In December

1984, China dis

resident

military attachés
to Cuba,
initiating a series of
friendly military contacts. Four
patched

years
to

later, China and Cuba ceased

require passport

visas of citizens

lifeline for the island's flagging
economy. Trade between the two

between the countries.
The two countries signed a trade
protocol in 1988 under which
China would buy nearly 100,000

countries has

surged

tons

that China is

now

largest trading

relations. Chávez and Castro have
forged a strong political alliance

rele

America, and

question, the rise of Venezuela's
Hugo Chávez led to the most dra
in Cuba's

Moscow-Beijing rivalry,
stymied any deeper alliance

China in the 1960s, and con
demned the country's invasion of
Vietnam in 1978. Relations began

In

Cuba, China represents

change

of the

than 45 years ago.

total breakdown during
the term of President Vicente Fox,
who has backed successive UN res
olutions condemning the state of
human rights in Cuba. Without

matic

drop

People's Republic
hardly novel; the two countries first
established diplomatic ties more

Cuba is

on

September 1, 1960, Fidel
Castro severed diplomatic ties with
Taiwan in favor of a relationship
with the People's Republic of
China. The two countries formally
established relations on September
28, 1960, making Cuba the first

which

are

Argentina, Brazil,

Morales in Bolivia continues this
trend. Meanwhile, Cuba's once
staunch alliance with Mexico has

On

Cuba's close alliance with the Soviet
Union took shape against the back

has

Evo

Ties

renewed interest in Cuba has been
the subject of considerable intrigue.
Of course, Cuba's relations with the

Cuba's relations in Latin America
are also in flux. Governments in

wing indigenous leader

investor.

Latin American country to recog
nize Mao's China. However,

power have cast a new light on this
historic bond. Since 2001, China

and Uruguay
have moved left-of-center and
increased diplomatic engagement
with Havana. The election of left

foreign

Against this backdrop of shifting
geopolitical alliances, China's

Castro told reporters that "Cuba
does not need Europe."

verged

If those investments material

ture.

top

recent

partner, but

12

some

Cuban medical and other highly
trained specialists have been dis

in

..

soured

in

ize, China could become Cuba's

unraveling
and new partnerships emerging.
Since 2001, Cuba has experienced
its most important realignment of
foreign relations since the collapse
of the Soviet Union in the early
1990s. The European Union
rernams an

sparked anxiety

quarters. More than 30,000

remarkably
........._�

that has

a

vital

new

the point
Cuba's second
to

partner after
Venezuela. The Chinese have also
pledged hundreds of millions of
dollars in investments in nickel,

petroleum exploration,

and

agricul-

traveling

of Cuban sugar largely on
barter for Chinese products. By

1990, annual Cuba-China trade

topped $600 million, and China
became second only to the Soviet
Union in trade with the island.
Among the bartered goods were the

Reports

The

new

Cuban President Fidel Castro salutes an honor guard
the Revolution in Havana on April l Z, 2001.

famous Chinese bicycles that
replaced many of Cuba's automo
biles

during

the

country's

post

Soviet economic crisis, known
the "Special Period."

as

Havana was one of the few capi
tals to express support for Beijing's
brutal repression of protestors in

as

face of an

he walks with then Chinese President Jiang Zemin

increasing closeness

between the

governments. State relations
reached a milestone in 1993 when
President Jiang Zemin became the
first Chinese head of state to visit
Cuba. Two years later, Castro
reciprocated with his first visit

to

Square in 1989, when
the Cuban foreign minister com

China. While his itinerary includ
ed perfunctory stops at the Great
Wall of China and Mao's Tomb, he

mended Chinese authorities for

also visited

Tiananmen

"defeating
acts." The

the

counterrevolutionary
response signaled

old relationship

Shanghai and
Guangzhou, two cities at the epi
center of China's
capitalist experi-

ment.

At the

reported

to

be

at

the Palace

time, Castro

quite

of

was

taken with

China's "market socialism," and
speculation abounded that the
increasing trade and diplomatic ties
would lead to a Chinese-style open

ing in Cuba. But the island was
entering a severe recession caused
by the end of Soviet subsidies, and
trade with China dwindled, in part
due to the collapse of Cuba's sugar
industry. Trade relations began a
slow rebound in 1996, when China

Hemisphere
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agreed to begin paying for Cuban
goods with hard currency, but
Cuba's conservative central planners
increasingly distanced themselves

pledged

from the Chinese economic model.

in

exploration

were

signed during

President Hu Jintao's visit to Cuba
in 2004. In addition, China
invest

to

a new

Cuban nickel

Moa, based in the
The Wonder Years

by Chinese
President Jiang Zemin played a
crucial role in reinvigorating the
commercial links. During this trip,
the two countries signed an eco
nomic and technical cooperation
agreement, which granted Havana
A 2001 visit

a

to

Cuba

$6.5 million line of interest-free

credit and
lion loan

additional $200 mil
modernize and expand

an

to

Cuba's telecommunications

at

the

local level. Another $150 million
credit was given for Cuba to

import

Chinese televisions.

In 2003, China made Cuba its

first

approved tourist destination in
the Western Hemisphere. The
World Tourism Organization pro
jected that China would be the
world's fourth-largest supplier of
tourists by 2020. However, China
has since added nearly 40 new
approved destinations, including
several other Caribbean islands and
South American countries.

'Although

some

land China

visitors from main

be

spotted in
Havana nightclubs, the island has
not
yet seen any large influx of
Chinese tourists and the special
designation remains largely symbol
ic. That may change if the much
discussed direct flights from Beijing
to Havana become a
reality.
The first joint venture between
Cuba and China was a plastic slip
per factory in Cuba that opened in
1997. By last year, the two coun
tries shared 10 operative joint ven
tures and three "cooperative pro
can

duction contracts," many with
like

higher-value production
phar
maceuticals and biotechnology.
Sixteen cooperation agreements in
nickel and mineral processing and
14
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$500 million

over

plant
Holguín

in

province. This would make China
the largest investor in Cuba's flour
ishing nickel market. With the
help of Chinese investment, Cuba
could double its nickel and cobalt
output, which is already the fourth
highest in the world. Hu also

offered credit for 1 million

more

Chinese "Panda" brand televisions,
known in Cuba to be rewards for
Communist

Party loyalists.

In

2005, collaboration between China
and Cuba

even

reached into the

island's oil sector with a major con
tract for
production with petrole

giant Sinopec.
Beyond trade ties, China and
Cuba are close diplomatic allies.
China has consistently opposed US
um

Cuba

sanctions

on

Nations.

In October

at

the United

2004, China's

deputy representative to the UN
Zhang Yishan rebuked the US for
its decision

and,

in

to

maintain the embar

doing, "obstinately
stick to the wrong position and
ignore the just demand of the
international community." In
April 2005, China reiterated its
longstanding opposition to US-led
go

efforts

so

condemn Cuba for its
repression of civil and political lib
erties.

to

For its part, Cuba has

strongly backed China's goal of
eventually reclaiming its "renegade
province" of Taiwan under the
"One China" policy. During a visit
to
Beijing in March 2005, Cuba's
Minister of Government Ricardo

Cabrisas Ruiz vowed support for
China's widely condemned Anti
Secession Law, which

contemplated
against Taiwan.

military
Some analysts even suspect that
China is using its telecommunica
action

tions involvement in Cuba

as cover

for

espionage against

the US.

Indeed, there has been speculation
that

Beijing

has taken

over

the

Lourdes spy base after Russia ended
its lease in 2001 and is operating
another base, Bejucal,
Santiago de Cuba.

near

China and Cuba's Future
Perhaps the most intriguing
aspect of the Cuba-China alliance
concerns the potential impact on
Cuba's eventual transition process
once Fidel Castro leaves power.
For many years, the United States

has

positioned itself as the single
most
important actor shaping
Cuba's post-Castro politics. While
other countries
especially
others in
and
Canada, Spain,
Europe conducted business in
Cuba, they basically agreed with
the U.S. objective of supporting
-

-

the island's evolution towards

a

market-oriented

democracy, even
though they disagreed with a sanc
tions-based approach. With the
notable exception of Venezuela
(and

now

Bolivia),

countries have

Latin American

generally distanced

themselves from the Cuban model
since the 1990s. After the collapse
of the Soviet Union, Cuba found
itself with trading partners but no
true

allies interested in

supporting

Cuba's communist system.
China, the emerging superpower,
has

undertaken significant
investments in Cuba and may have
an

now

maintaining the
current political order

interest in

island's

once

Fidel Castro leaves the stage.
Chinese diplomatic engagement in
Cuba is a consensus policy for
China's Communist Party. It suits
two of China's most
important for

eign policy goals: securing natural
resources for a
rapidly growing
economy, and

that

rewarding

countries

uphold a "One China" policy,
which precludes diplomatic sup
port for Taiwan. History has

Reports

condemned market forces at every
turn.
In his 2003 visit to Beijing, a
bemused Castro told the head of

shown that trade and commercial
relations between China and Cuba

ebb and flow in response
.

.

to

changecon

omy could quickly diminish if its
investments do not yield dividends

if China's

US policy and director

for

Caribbean programs

at

of

the Inter

.

Ing economic circumstances.
China's support of the Cuban

am

visiting,

of

because the

appeared

one

way and

now

visit it appears another

Cuban
which have

on

hemispheric affairs)
appeared in such publications

when I

Miami

as

The

Herald) National Interest)

and World

way." By

Cuba has resisted embrac
the type of change that has

Policy Journal. He
co-editor of Transforming

is

ing

Socialist Economies: Lessons for

fact,

as

enormous

Cuba and

growth.

Unfettered

free markets

or

by

rights,

recent

work

on

�

Adam

concerns over

human

His

Chinas relations with
Latin America and the Caribbean.

investment have grown, Havana has
recentralized control over its econo
my.

Beyond.

has focused

Chinese trade, aid, and

for

burgeoning ties with Cuba
have helped to breathe new life into
the most retrograde tendencies of
Fidel Castro's aging revolution. II
China's

its economy, while Fidel Castro has

New from the

than 20 articles

the

In

leadership touts
China's friendship as an example of
socialist solidarity, but the two
countries are separated by an
increasing ideological divide.
China has progressively liberalized

He is the author

contrast,

fueled China's

irreversible.

more

Dialogue.

and

first time I visited, your country

own

The Cuban

American

the Chinese legislature, that "I can't
really be sure just now what kind of

China I

growth slows, as
some analysts have predicted.
Although Cuba's diplomatic rela
tions with China are firmly rooted,
its commercial ties have been cycli
cal, and this newest peak of trade
and investment is by no means
or

Daniel P. Erikson is senior associate

¥_ínson

is program assistant

the Caribbean

American

interuieios

at

Dialogue.

the Inter
His

writings

and

the Caribbean
have appeared in the Baltimore Sun)
Boston Globe) and Journal of
on

Democracy.

University of North Carolina

Press
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CUBA AND THE TEMPEST
LITERATURE AND CINEMA IN THE TIME OF DIASPORA

by

Eduardo González

unique analysis of Cuban literature inside and outside the country's borders, Eduardo González looks closely at the
work of three important contemporary Cuban authors: Guillermo Cabrera Infante (1929-2005), who left Cuba for good in
1965 and established himself in London; Antonio Benítez-Rojo (1931-2005), who settled in the United States; and Leonardo
Padura Fuentes (b. 1955), who still lives and writes in Cuba. Through the positive experiences of exile and wandering that
In

a

appear in their

work, these three

writers exhibit what González calls "Romantic

authorship," a deep connection to the
Romantic spirit of irony and complex sublimity crafted in literature by Lord Byron, Thomas De Quincey and Samuel Taylor
Coleridge. In González's view, a writer becomes a belated Romantic by dint of exile adopted creatively with comic or trag
ic irony. González weaves into his analysis related cinematic elements of myth, folktale and the grotesque that appear in the
work of filmmakers such as Alfred Hitchcock and Pedro Almodóvar. Placing the three Cuban writers in conversation with
artists and thinkers from British and American literature, anthropology, philosophy, psychoanalysis and cinema, González
ultimately provides a space in which Cuba and its literature, inside and outside its borders, are deprovincialized.
major work of scholarship and reflection by a uniquely talented critic in his prime. Employing an eclectic
approach that blends myth criticism and psychoanalysis, González, at his best, is nothing short of dazzling."
-Gustavo Pérez Firmat, Columbia University
'�

Eduardo González teaches literature and cinema at The Johns

including

Hopkins University.

He is author of three other

books,

The Monstered Self: Narratives of Death and Performance in Latin American Fiction.
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Blood

Young
by Frank

O. Mora

erhaps

no

other institu

tion of the Cuban

has

regime

such fun

undergone
damental changes
mission,

in its

structure,

and

in the last decade-and-a

personnel

half than the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias

(FAR).

The Cuban

armed forces shifted its focus from
proletarian internationalism to

assuming responsibility for reform
ing and managing the economy in
an effort to survive the
Special
Period.

It is the institution respon

sible for

introducing

and

imple
the
de
sistema
perfec
menting
cionamiento empresarial (SPE), a sys
tem that introduces
principles of
capitalist organization and manage
ment as a means of
making the
economy

more

efficient and com
strength declined

petitive. Troop
significantly after 1990 from over
200,000 to approximately 45,000
active soldiers in

2004, and

its

equally slashed by nearly
50 percent over a period of almost a
decade. Finally, since the early
1990s new generations of FAR offi
cers have been
promoted to general
officer rank, holding key positions
in the military high command and
budget

was

in state-controlled economic indus
tries.

Such

change

in what is

arguably the Cuban Revolution's
most important and powerful insti
tution-key to its consolidation and
survival-is worthy of careful analy
sis. Yet, despite the restructuring
and the reformist economic outlook
of many of its leaders, the Cuban

military remains very much an insti
tution loyal to the regime and to its
succession strategy when Fidel

Castro passes from the

16
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scene.

It

question, is the FAR an
agent of change or continuity?
Answering this question can help
shed light on future prospects for
democracy and market economy in
a
post-Fidel Cuba.
An illustrative way of addressing
this question is by focusing on the
dramatic changes that have taken
place in the leadership of the FAR's
military command structure. New
generations of general officers with
very unique experiences and out
looks have assumed critical positions
in the general staff, regional com
mands, and key economic industries
managed by the Ministry of the
FAR (Minfar). Since the mid1990s, a number of generals, with

begs

the

strong credentials as históricos, died
or retired, and were
replaced by gen
eral officers

1998) that

(promoted
were

in 1992 and

all born between

the mid-1940s and 1952. Members
of this group where either too
young

to

Army

or,

have been in the Rebel
as

in the

General Rafael

of

Brigadier
Borjas Ortega, only
case

toddlers when Fidel Castro and his
men
departed for Cuba on the
Granma.

enough

to

Only some

were

have served

as

old

milicianos

members of other paramilitary
groups that fought against domestic
or

counterrevolutionary forces

in the

1960s.
Raúl Castro-defense minister
and heir

apparent-worked to bring
in younger officers with special skills
to
help reform the economy and
ensure stability and institutional
cohesion within the FAR, key
requirements of any succession strat
egy. Many of these camilitos, (the
name
given to graduates of the pre-

cadet Camilo

Cienfuegos Military
province) in
late 40s, replaced the

Schools located in each
their mid

to

since then have

históricos, and
solidated their

position

as

con

the future

power brokers of Cuba. Raúl
Castro acknowledged in 2000 that

positions of command
political influence within the

from their
and

FAR, economy, party, and govern
ment,

these officers "have the

opportunity, according to their
experiences and interests, to rethink
their own formulas of continuity
and

change

in Cuba."

Raúl elaborated "there
camilitos that

In late 2001,
are

already

generals and
colonels commanding important
combat units and in a majority of
key positions in the general staffs of
the regional commands." This gen
erational shift in the general officer
corps

over a

are

span of less than

decade-and-a-half has led

a

to a num

ber of public
at

times

policy changes-albeit
vacillating because of Fidel

Castro's resistance
can

be described

to

by

reform-that
an

axiom often

repeated by some in the military
leadership: "the more things change,
the greater the chance of continu

ity." In other words, peaceful
change and continuity (i.e., preserv
ing the Revolution's accomplish
ments) depends on implementing
and consolidating some key reforms.
There is a slightly older genera
tion of general officers that fought
as
young combatants in the July 26
movement and are
today between
60 and 65 years of age. They are
the camilitos that Raúl referred
to, nor are they agents of retrench
not

ment.

Their formative

experience

in

the Sierra and their close bonds with

Reports

Continuity and change

within Cuba's

Revolutionary Armed Forces
the históricos is what defines these
so-called

"Young

Rebels." The bet

known officers in this group are
Rogelio Acevedo (president of the
ter

Civil Aviation Institute), Abelardo
Colomé Ibarra (Minister of Interior
and First

Deputy Minister of

Minfar), Leopoldo

Cintra Frías

(commander of Western Army),
Joaquín Quintas Solá (commander
of Central Army), and Ramón
Espinosa Martín (commander of
Eastern Army). As heads of com
mands and key ministries, these
generals see their primary role as
defense of the Revolution and
nation against armed aggression
from abroad. These officers

recognize

fully

that defense of the home

land is tied

to

economic revitaliza

tion. Their outlook and focus is

on

military and
defense, but within their strategic
understanding of regime survival
and orderly succession is the need
for economic restructuring.
The next two generations-pro
issues related

to

the

moted in 1992 and 1998

to

brigadier general-have a distinct
outlook and responsibility. Their
loyalty to the Revolution and its
leadership is unequivocal. Those in
the 1992 generation-Álvaro López
Miera (chief of the general staff and
first deputy minister of Minfar),
Leonardo Andollo Valdés (deputy
chief of the general staff), Pedro
Mediondo Gómez

(head

of the Air

Defense Minister Raúl Castro has
brought in young officers with special
skills to reform the economy and main
tain stability within the FAR, and,
ultimately, ensure regime continuity.
Hemisphere
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Reports

Defense and Air Force, DAAFAR),
and José Antonio Carrillo Gómez

(chief of Minfar's political

very close to Raúl
Castro and his succession project,

ening

expanding

and

deep

economic reforms and

the rank of division

generals.

Because of their age and close bonds
to Raúl, they are likely to remain in

positions of military and political
influence for the

next seven to

12

education

they

shaped

received in

are man

agers and administrators, in addi
tion to being soldiers. Through the

application of Western business
techniques (i.e. SPE), they are
attempting to enhance the efficiency
and productivity of military and
civilian industries during a period of
crisis and change for the regime.
Not all of these officers participate
in the military's economic endeav
however. Some like BG Ermio
Hernández Rodríguez (chief of staff

ors,

years.

Like the

previous generation,
those promoted to flag officer rank
in 1992 are quite enthusiastic about
adapting the Chinese and
Vietnamese model to Cuba. Again,
the central

tenet

of the model is that

and

Western

Army),
(Eastern Army),

José Rosello
in the

BG

Miguel

Abud

and

Navy CAPT
hold key positions

Pérez

regional commands; however,

the technocrats-the

most

visible
head

deepening eco
nomic reforms, the regime is able to
improve the standard of living of

group-manage enterprises
ministries. Some of the more

notable of this

promotion include;

Cubans and thus, establish new
bases of legitimacy for the regime in

BG Luis Pérez

Rospide (Gaviota,

by expanding

post-Fidel Cuba. This core of
military leaders have always been
less interested in the Soviet military
economic model, preferring the
a

or

S.A.), BG Eladio Fernández Cívico
(Grupo Empresarial Geocuba), BG
Luis Bernal León

Industrial Union), BG Moisés Sio
Wong (former president of Institute

role in economic reform and

Communications)

ganization. They experienced

first

hand the material difficulties and
disappointments of the late 1980s
suffered up
close the intensity and the magni
tude of the hardships associated
with this period. As a result, these
and

early

1990s.

They

(many of them engi
neers and logistic experts) are more
pragmatic and receptive to the need
"technocrats"

for economic reforms

as a means

of

only mitigating the impact of
the Special Period on themselves
and the FAR, but, more important
ly, on society and the future of the
not

regIme.
In addition

experiences
Hemisphere

to

the transformative

of the

Special Period,

Volume 17

But

and their

despite
predilec

this experience
tion for military-led economic

reform, these colonels-such

as

Colonel Oscar Basulto Torres

(Habanos, S.A.),

Colonel

Jose

Manuel Vivo (Aero Gaviota),
Colonel Manuel Marrero Cruz

(Minister of Tourism), and

Lt.

Colonel Rene

Rojas Rodríguez
(Tecnotext)-have not necessarily
turned against Fidel, his retrench
ment, or the Revolution. Quite the
contrary. Perhaps more than any
other generation, these senior offi
convinced and committed
the notion that the survival and

cers are

to

continuity

political

of the

regime depends

on

reform, albeit without

economic

liberalization. The lesson

that these and the previous two gen
erations draw from the Chinese and
Vietnamese

cases

is that unless the

well-being of the Cuban
people is improved, the legitimacy
and popular support of the regime
are likely to wane.
Liberalization and reform is
viewed

(Military

of State Reserves), and BG Silvano
Colas Sánchez (former Minister of

reor

group of senior officers.

material

of China and Vietnam,
particularly in terms of the military's
structures

18

by the

outlook is

These "technocrat -soldiers"

engagement with the international
economic system. Since 1998 many
of these officers have been promoted
to

generation's

business management programs in
Europe, Asia, and Latin America.

direc

torate)-are

which involves

this

not

the

principles
of the Revolution. The pragmatism
of these officers is, in fact, perceived
as

as a

betrayal

to

evidence of their steadfast

com

Below in rank and age lies an
influential cohort of colonels and

finding alternative and
effective means of defending and
strengthening the Revolution in the
post-Soviet era and, inevitably, in a

lieutenant colonels, most of them
between 40 and 45 years old, who
have very similar backgrounds and

post- Fidel Cuba. The survival and
continuity of the regime hinges on
the ability to reform and make nec

experiences

to

.

their

superiors.

In

mitment

essary

to

adjustments.

The technocrats

the last 12 years they, too, were
exposed to a considerable number of
exchanges and interactions with mil

of the FAR and many of their supe
riors understand that Fidelismo
without Fidel is a guarantee that

itary institutions and officers

succession

in

China and Vietnam, as well as tak
ing courses on business management
methods in Latin America and
Europe. The socioeconomic hard
shi ps associated with the

Special
Period of the 1990s-particularly
the downsizing of the FAR-had a
profound and lasting impact on this

or

continuity will

fail. II

Frank O. Mora is professor of national
security strategy at the National Uíár

College,

National

Defense University.

He is the author ofseveral studies
the Cuban military.
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in Cuba

G. Barbería

by Lorena

Cuba's labored

s

gence from the

emer

eco

nomic crisis of the

1990s continues,
important new trends

consumption and
socioeconomic mobility have
emerged. For many households

Confronting the challenges of
social and economic change

in household

access to

to

with

remittances from abroad

tourism and other

economy driven

sectors

by foreign

or

of the

direct

investment, the past decade has

cre

opportunities for income
generation and social mobility. Yet,
ated

new

for those whose economic fortunes
are

tied

more

strapped

closely

state,

to

the cash

real income has

Latin American countries that expe
rienced severe economic contractions
in the last

which

gains

reversed
cy

was

two

or

decades and

during

in social reforms

were

halted, Cuban social poli

responsive.

The Cuban

state

countered economic shocks based

strategy: the reallo
cation of government resources, the
a

three-pronged

adoption of innovative

social

poli

cies, and the increase in social expen
reinforce the social

and economic

among individuals in their sub

ences

jective perceptions of needs and the
cultural and political norms of equal
ity embedded in Cuba's social fabric
over

the

of the last four

course

decades.
In

of these

the ques

declined and mobility prospects have
narrowed. There is an evolving spa
tial dimension to these divergent for

ditures

sparked by the collapse

of the Soviet

(or expenditures)

well: poorer and more eco
nomically isolated households tend

Union in 1989, strong

political will

progress on social mobility for signif
icant portions of the population, sep

tunes as

to concentrate

such

as

in

the rural

particular regions,
eastern areas

of the

net.

to

safety

In the aftermath of the crisis

and the

proactive

role of the

state

have continued to guarantee mini
mum levels of welfare and social
pro
Cuba

tection. As CEPAL

periphery of metropolitan

programs, the highest investment in
Latin America.

Havana.

the nation

as a

whole, these striking

challenges for
Cuba's economic and social policy,
for its political life, and for the egali
new

patterns represent

tarianism that Cuba's leaders have

endeavored
a

to

defend for almost half

spends

Mobility, Poverty, and
Inequality since the 1990s
In spite of its status as a low
income developing country, Cuba's
social policy has been recognized for
its conquest of significant gains in
social indicators. In the 1990s, con
trary to what happened in many

Hemisphere

Volume 17

are some

signs

consumption

fell

While it is clear that income

scope of poverty remains
issue of significant debate.
exact

the

an

that formal

needs for the
to

pathways to social mobility in Cuban
society, creating new pockets of
poverty and fewer options for mobil

con

wage income and market segmenta
tion have limited the coverage of
tion. Relative

Cuban economy has increased
income inequality and altered the

have

to

that the

emerged
restructuring of the

and limited

increased poverty in
Cuba since 1989 has become central.
There

of its GDP in social

inequality has undoubtedly risen,
Social

tributed

consumption

showing

changes,

arately or combined,

Yet, evidence has also

ity.

century.

32%

highlights,

light

tion of whether lower real incomes

island, and even in particular neigh
borhoods, such as those on the
Combined with lackluster economic
growth and fiscal over-extension for

20

on

opportunities, and
difficulties in capturing the adequacy
of the state's provision of universal
social policies. These factors are fur
ther complicated by emerging differ
ity

popula

pre-1989 levels,

dramatically

between 1990 and 1993, with a
modest decline in social and govern

spending and a much larger
drop in private spending. In subse
quent years, although total expendi
tures have risen, consumption by
ment

Cuban households continues
remain below

pre-1989 levels.

to

The

impact of the
multifaceted changes taking place are
complicated by the need to account

available evidence also indicates that
Cuba's recovery in household con

patterns, such as the marked
differences in formal and informal

income, has been

Measurements of the

for

new

earnings, the changes

in social mobil-

sumption, but
social and
For

some,

not

household

largely driven by
government expenditures.
there are significant con-

Features

that official income estimates

cerns

understating the real level of
unmet needs and inequality.
The scope and magnitude of these
may be

transformations, however,

much

are

today than
they were prior to 1989. Not only is
there a general shortage of publicly
difficult

more

to measure

available data, but the emergence of
diversified survival strategies has

complicated data gathering and
analysis due to the increase in nonof
ficial

sources

of income included in

population's real
income and expenditures (GDP,
household budget surveys and
measures

of the

macroeconomic wage and income

stand

out.

long run, unless eco
nomic growth is enhanced, it is
unlikely that the state will have the
resources and
ability to continue its
expenditures and financing of social
services at current levels. Coupled
with multiple natural and political
adversities pounding the island,
Cuba has struggled to sustain its eco
nomic recovery. While social spend
ing investments have continued to
grow, GDP growth has remained
lackluster. With the state being the
only social program provider, the
risks of a collapse in the safety net
First, in the

greater

are even

as

individuals have

lenge to measuring income, poverty,
and inequality among Cuban house

for education,
health care, and other needs.
Sustainability is also clearly essential

holds.

for

These factors present

data).

In addition

ed with the

to

chal

a

difficulties associat

measurement

trends, challenges also

of these

Increasingly,

poverty
research worldwide has sought
progress.
move

to

traditional economic
of GDP and household

beyond

measures

consumption
cators,

such

toward alternative indi

as

no

the Human

other

have been the

adolescents, workforce

re-training.
grams hope to address
In

development

Can universal pro

and

the

prolifera

years, Cuban policy has
increase investment in uni

recent

to

First education and then health have

given

schools

Volume 17

of social workers in vul

nerable barrios and

new

workforce

traInIng uuuatrves,
Cen tral to these strategies is the
role of government, which remains
in the field of social

actor

social

policy

debates

surfacing on
whether social policy should be uni
versal or targeted, and whether cen
ness,

or

are

decentralized models of

delivery would

effective in the
On the

new

one

economic

to

most

con

hand, the central

ized character of social
access

be

policy has

minimum levels of

consumption goods, such

as

food. Moreover, the government has
been able to mobilize the preparation
and response to natural disasters,
witnessed during the active 2005
Atlantic hurricane

season,

as

through

planning, as successful as it has been
in addressing some social problems,
has proven inflexible in addressing
the specific needs of communities or
sectors of the population. "One size
fits all" interventions have only suc
ceeded in reproducing inequality.

were

Hemisphere

include the

social services: social assistance, med
ical care, education and programs for

education, classes

development with priority
social policy, three essential

deployment

examples

centralized

solidate its

to con

nerable. Some

lems-as it does allover the world
there will be diversified demand for

investments. In

to

a

complex economy and a rapid
ly differentiating population. As
income inequality translates into
unequal distribution of social prob

experienced large

seek

interventions

have been introduced and aimed at
addressing the needs of the most vul

certain

versal programs while adding target
ed interventions for the neediest.
to

targeted

time,

assured

begun

As Cuba continues

local communities. At the

the architect and guarantor, some
question the effectiveness of this

basic needs, as
urement tool.

Challenges

same

to

tralized

as

tion and diversification of needs?

The Fundamental

closer

text.

poverty rates, which compares house
hold incomes to a market basket of

outfitted

high technology medical equip
ment, bringing high-tech medicine

standing social problems. While rec
ognizing the state's fundamental role

more

meas

the

Cuba surges ahead, with

were

with

social service

as

clinics

some

hallmark of Cuban social policy and
have helped it swiftly address long

strategy

appropriate

vated and

innovations that have been strength
ened and tracking policy effective

Second, large-scale initiatives,

Development Index, that capture
multiple aspects of human well
being, many of which are not cap
tured by economic indicators.
Scholars have also sought to capture
other critical dimensions, including
social exclusion and capabilities,
thus, broadening what constitutes
development. The Cuban experience
continues to speak to long-standing
debates about the inadequacies of

an

increased. In health care, policlinics
and family doctor's offices were reno

policy. By examining

conditions of these services.

designed centrally,

ted with televisions and computers,
and the salaries of teachers were

the sole

options

political reasons as the state's
legitimacy is undoubtedly tied to

exist with

respect to what paradigms should be
used to measure development and

22

(and related) challenges

were

reduced,

refurbished and outfit-

planning.

On the other

hand, centralized

For those who raise these

targeted

concerns,

interventions that protect

and support the individuals
affected by the decade-long

most
econom

urgently needed. For
some, social policy must be linked to
new definitions of inequality and the
ic crisis

are

Features

policy of
equality. What level of equality
not egalitarianism-is desirable and
construction of a

under what conditions
attained?

It also

cators

new

can

ipalities
new

requires recogni

be

at

and, therefore,

structure

the

center

of the

design

must

of

policy.
Finally, after

decades of attention
the economic, social, and cultural

consequences of uneven
ment,

develop
new
spatial inequalities have

made themselves felt with consider
able force once again. Cuba's limited
reinsertion into international tourism

and other economic

growth

investment and

distributing

sectors

jobs

is

in

distinct territorial patterns. To be
sure, the tourism industry is drawn
to

localities with certain assets, such

historical treasures, beaches, or
nature
preserves, that are difficult
as

in

some

cate

cases,

from

one

in the

or,

impossible to dupli
place to the next.

disad

within Cuba's cities

case

perhaps this is
of the country's

A closer look

capital.

at

Havana

interesting story because
the usual assumptions about poverty
and place miss the reality of the situ
ation in this city. The absence of
investment in the nation's capital as a
result of decades of policies that
favored development in the country
reveals

an

side may lead
poverty is
Havana.

one

to

think that

extremely widespread in
Despite the extreme physi

cal deterioration of Havana's build
ings, streets, and homes, the city's
residen ts have
one

would

q uali ty of life that
expect. It is not just

a

not

their

status

the urban poor that live in the

city's

and their life

chances have

changed substantially.
Place did not necessarily represent a
barrier to mobility and status in
But what role will it

socialist Cuba.

also marked and

more so

of invest

most

latter has resulted in many families
remaining in the same "place"

although

easternmost

clearly the

are

vantaged.
The dynamics
are

stream

dollars. The

provinces

are

social
to

economy and those further

ment

today an organizing factor of Cuban
social

more

removed from the

it be

tion that economic differences

provinces and munic
integrated into the

between

playas

new

socioeconomic

emerge in the

structures

country?

And what about

race or

class back

ground? Is it possible that the poli
cies of "equal treatment" that have
been in place for decades today are
reproducing inequality? As new
.

.

socioeconorruc patterns emerge,

should-more individualized attention
be

given

to

the

most

suggest, there is a
take a deeper look

As these

questions

pressing

need

to

disadvantaged?

the concepts that drive and the
the benefits of
process that distribute
at

policy. Addressing income
inequality and poverty, and its
social

uneven

will

distribution

require finely

tions that

across

the island,

tuned interven
the intimate under

rely on

of the local

political

standing

abroad-also follows a spatial pat
tern. With higher historic migration

dilapidated neighborhoods; doctors,
engineers, and other professionals
make their homes here as well, giv
ing Havana's communities a remark
able mix of human capital.
Conversely, some old housing of the

from urban areas, particularly
Havana, and with geographic mobil

upper and middle class, who
longer live in Cuba, are now

no

address structural conditions.

occu

Without

Similarly,

there is

some

evidence

to

suggest that access to the other main
source of US dollars in Cuba's dual
economy-remittances from

ity very

limited

on

the island since

expect that
receipt of remittance dollars and the
consumer networks
generated from

1959, it is reasonable

these flows

are

Havana and
cities.

a

to

concentrated in
small number of other

Furthermore,

a

racial skew in

population of Cubans abroad
may be contributing to unequal
remittance income by race on the
the

of extractions,

occupied

that

from the humblest

as

housing early on

The market driven investment in
tourism and ancillary industries has
of the country
have obtained great economic benefit
while others have lagged behind.
that

some areas

Studies have documented the grow
ing gap in human development indi-

my and the conditions it spawns,
and the active participation of those

by them. In order to not
reproduce inequality, solutions will
have to go beyond the palliative and
affected

in the

a

critical

reassessment

of

policy, the process of stratifica
taking place in Cuba will con

social
tion

many peasants

tinue. II

revolution.
There is
between

clear

disjuncture
income/status and housing.
a

reflection of the tremen
dous social mobility that universally
available education, access to health

This is

a

(and other benefits),

and

policies
employment
and housing have made possible for
those who were poor prior to 1959.
Havana's housing paradox is also the
result of policies that have for
decades discouraged the sale of hous
ing and even the use of income to
improve housing conditions. The
care

of nondiscrimination in

island.

meant

pied by persons

econo
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Cuba's New
Corrales

by Javier

ver

since the

collapse

of

the Soviet bloc in the
early 1990s, Cuba has

been
_�

desperately seeking
"d a dd y,

a new

"

an exter-

nal patron willing to provide mate
rial resources with few strings
attached. The Soviet Union played
for Cuba

beautifully

offering

trade subsidies and other

aid with few conditions
domestic

political

on

by

how

government enormous material
benefits without the obligation

modify

to

affairs. After

domestic

the medium term, the Cuban state,
whether headed by Fidel Castro or
successor,

ly for

its

will have

level of material support was gener
ous in the 1990s, but never as mas

known about the

unconditional

as

the sup

port delivered by the Soviet Union,
And starting in 2000, the EU even

began

to

impose

some

Cuba for human
Around the

rights

same

sanctions

on

violations.

time that the

international environment

was

start

ing to look dark for Cuba again,
along came Venezuela, eager to
serve as Cuba's new
"daddy." What
began as a seemingly innocuous set
of agreements between both coun
tries is today a major alliance

involving the exchange of strategic
assets, including energy resources,
large financial operations, informa
tion technology, development aid,
intelligence services, highly trained
personnel, military assets, and joint
business

ventures.
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Cuba, the

for

For Cuba,

92,000

bpd

the other hand,
represents an invaluable
on

lifeline. It allows Cuba

satisfy its
rather unusual, surplus-maximizing
energy policy. Most oil-importing
countries have a straightforward
energy policy: They use interna
tional trade agreements to acquire
the energy that they need domesti
cally; and this need is, in turn,
determined by the pace of economic
development and the energy effi
to

ciency of its industrial and trans
portation sectors. Cuba follows a

The Nature of the

or as

pay dear

dependence on
Venezuela, just as it paid dearly
its dependence on the Soviet

potential replacement
patron. In the interest of making a
political statement against the US
policy of isolating Cuba, the EU
adopted a policy of economic and
diplomatic constructive engage
ment, which Cuba hoped to exploit
to its
advantage. But Cuba's dream
never
fully materialized: Europe's
sive

to

new

Union.

as a

to

But in

policies.

the demise of the USSR, Cuba
looked to the European Union

(EU)

24

alliance with Venezuela represents
an enviable political accomplish
ment. The deal offers the Cuban

his

this role

run

Daddy

Exchange:

Cheap Contributions, Valuable
Gifts
Cuba and Venezuela have

signed

three rounds of

cooperative agree
ments: in 2000, shortly after the
election of Hugo Chávez Frías
(1999-present); in September 2004;
and in April 2005. Very little is

different

approach.

More than satis

its domestic energy needs,
Cuba seeks to maximize energy sur

fying

pluses-i.e., acquire far more oil
than is domestically needed so as to
re-export surpluses in exchange for
hard currency. To achieve this,
Cuba represses industrial and trans

inexpensive for the
sender but of enormous strategic
value to the recipient, with oil as
the most important component for

portation development (so as to
keep domestic energy needs low)
while simultaneously trying to find
vast quantities of oil abroad.
During the Cold War, the USSR
provided this excess oil, which Cuba
re-exported for a profit. But for
Cuba, this Soviet gift was not
enough; the more oil it could

Cuba.

secure,

content

of these

agreements, but this much is clear:
The agreements benefit both coun
tries

by enabling
that

assets

them

to

Venezuela sends

approximately
day (bpd) of oil

92,000 barrels per
to Cuba. For Venezuela,
with

enormous

far from

exchange

are

oil

a

reserves,

an onerous

country

this is

contribution.

the

more

it could re-exporto

This

surplus-seeking energy policy
explains many of Cuba's boldest for
eign policies. As exiled Cuban gen
eral Rafael del Pino y Díaz
explained, it is the reason that Cuba

armed insurrection in
oil-rich Venezuela in the 1960s, and

page 26 provides some
reference points. Venezuela's oil

financed

Cuba in 2005 rep
resented less than 3.50/0 of its total

when that failed, tried

oil

ence

Table 1

on

contribution

to

production (which is currently
far below actual capacity). For
Venezuela, this is an easily afford
able subsidy.

year,

an

keep a 15heavy-handed military pres

of 40,000 troops
oil-rich Angola (while

Mozambique's request
levels of support).

to

or more

in

disregarding
for similar

Features

Venezuelan-Cuban relations since 2000
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TABLE 1: VENEZUELA'S OIL INDICATORS IN RELATIVE TERMS

Index

Day

(Venezuela's IQ05
production 100)

9,000,000

340.91

5,800,000

219.70

3,300,000

125.00

2,640,000

100.00

1,700,000

64.39

1,500,000

56.82

522,000

19.77

135,000

5.11

92,000

3.48

68,000

2.58

Average

Barrels

Per

Saudi Arabia's Production

(a)

Venezuela's 2012 Production

Target (b)
in 2002 (a)
IQ05 (a)

Venezuela's Total Production
Venezuela's Total Production
PDVSXs share (c)
Venezuela's

Exports

to

the US

Consumption, 2004
Targeted Exports to China (d)
Estimated Exports to Cuba, 2005 (e)
Exports to China (d)

Venezuela's Domestic

=

Sources:

(a) Energy Information Administration, www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international
(b) www.pdvsa.com (c) Veneconomía estimates (d) El Universal, August 24, 2005

The main benefit of Cuba's new
deals with Venezuela is that it allows

international guarantees and a sig
nificant part of the debt can be

again its surplus
maximizing energy policy. Cuba
produces approximately 80,000 bpd
of oil, which is 40,000 bpd short of
the country's domestic needs, cur
rently estimated at approximately
120,000 bpd. The agreements with
Venezuela thus provide Cuba
enough to cover this shortfall and
still leave some 40,000-50,000 bpd
for re-exporting. Furthermore,
Venezuela is offering oil under gen

repaid

Cuba

to

fulfill

subsidies. Oil expert Gustavo
Coronel estimates that because pay
erous

ment terms are so

Cuba, Venezuela

favorable

is

to

providing

Cuba

approximately 20,000 to 26,000
bpd of free oil, amounting to a
"gift" of $6 billion to $8 billion
over

the

ment

15 years. The arrange
allows Cuba to pay 250/0 of oil
next

15 years at interest
of 20/0 and with a two-year

shipments
rates

grace

26

over

period. Payment requires
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no

in services.

In

(e) El Universal, September 10, 2005

April 2006,

of US$1.3 million per day
from the resale of unused Soviet oil.
enues

If today Cuba is

reselling 40,000

of Venezuelan oil

the 2005

Venezuela rewarded Cuba with yet
another subsidy: an agreement to
finance the refurbishing of the

bpd

Cienfuegos oil refinery, which was
completed in 1990 with obsolete
Soviet technology, but left idle
shortly thereafter because of its inef
ficiency. Refurbishing this refinery

almost twice what it made

could
lion

than US$l 00 mil
may never prove worth

cost more

(and
while).

Cuba has thus

essentially regained

the lucrative oil business that it

enjoyed with the USSR prior to
1991, with only one difference:
This time, Cuba is making more
money. In 1989, the USSR

Cuba

sent

approximately 260,000 bpd,
of which Cuba used 200,000 bpd,
and then resold the 60,000 bpd sur
plus. At US$22.05 per barrel (the
average world price for oil in 1989),
Cuba was probably generating rev-

at

average price of $58.16, its
is near US$2.3 million per

the Soviet

revenue

day,
during

era.

for oil, Cuba sends
Venezuela between 30,000 and
50,000 technical workers, of which
In

return

about 30,000 are medical doctors.
The rest include sport coaches,
teachers, and arts instructors, as well
undisclosed number of intelli
gence, political, and military advis
as an

ers.

There is debate about how

presumed doctors limit
their role to practicing medicine
and how many are political-military
advisers in disguise, but if we accept
official statements that they are sim
ply doctors, then Cuba is exporting
one-fifth of its medical profession
als. This is a large number, but one
many of the

still affordable for Cuba, which has

Features

medical

More than
100,000 Venezuelans have traveled
to Cuba in 2005 to receive eye

CUBA'S MEDICAL SURPLUS

TABLE 2:

Infant

No. of doctors per

mortality

1000 live

10,000 inhabitants,
1995

per

births,

near

treatment.

In addition

ical benefits

they provide, these trips
political purpose by

also

1995

treatment.

serve a

allowing
17.7

4

USA

24.5

7

Germany
Norway

31.0

5

24.0

4

Switzerland

30.1

5

aside the

Netherlands

23.8

5

two

..

12.0

12

Venezuela derives

Cuba

40.0

11

nomic and

to

q uan tify because

of doctors.
a

far

own

and

high
demand for exit visas, especially on
the part of professionals. According
underemployment

to

a

James Cason, former head of the

US Interests Section in Havana,
since 2002 more than 100,000
Cubans have entered the consular

refugee annex in that
seeking to emigrate to the

section and
ci ty

United States and another 81,400
have requested non-immigrant visas.
Furthermore, Cuba has also been

experiencing

a

serious "domestic

and

even

convenient because it

allows the government to meet
some of the demand for exit
oppor

secret,

enormous eco

military

benefits that

are

Venezuela's

rifles that the
than three

100,000 Russian AK-I03s and AK-

chance

reward

well-behaving

by deciding who

zens

to a

to

state one more

gets

to

citi

travel

more

approximately

104s. Venezuela will build factories
to

produce

ammunition for these

rifles. There is talk in 2006 of
acquiring Russian helicopters and

freer and richer country.

Sukhoi advanced

What Venezuela Gains

second

For the Venezuelan government,

pillar

fighter jets.

of the

current

The

reform

the deals with Cuba also yield polit
ical payoffs. Cuban workers are sta

is the creation of urban reservists

tioned in poor areas where few
highly trained Venezuelans render

international

social services. This allows the gov
ernment to establish a presence in

with "the maintenance of internal
order." Estimates place the num

areas

where

(and

thus

political competition
political accountability)

ber of
is

of

jobs, where
incomes are much higher. For
Cuba, therefore, sending highly
trained personnel, especially doc

appreCIatiVe.
The agreement also calls for edu

potential

new

voters,

terms

are

defend the nation in the
reservists

There is evidence that many recipi
ents of these medical services are

Venezuela is thus affordable

compliant Belgian

offers the Cuban

engineering professions)
migrating from state-controlled jobs
sector

launched in 2004, involves two
dimensions. First, the government
is seeking to replace the NATO

decades with

ical and

to

are

army has used for

(both

low and the rewards, in

tors,

hard

are

from the country or
from state-controlled jobs). It also
tunities

brain drain" since the mid 1990s,
with high-skill workers (in the med

toward informal

they

the

rapprochement
with Cuba is helping Chávez in his
latest effort to reform the military.
This most recent military reform,

health achievements, as
measured by infant mortality rates.
Furthermore, Cuba has significant
its

assets

observe.

to

'First,

(2002)

shows, Cuba has

more

Leaving

trade, which

countri es

Chile

greater number of doctors per capita
relative to rich countries and relative
to

"intelligence"

6

As Table 2

point of view,

than oil-for-labor/services.

22.1

extraordinary surplus

state to

the deal with Cuba involves

Canada

Source: Madrid-Aris

the med

with travel

loyalists

opportunIties.
From Venezuela's

easy

an

the Venezuelan

also reward

Japan

to

high.

the

are

event

to

of

aggression. The
also supposed to help

current

reservists

government's goal

at

is

300,000;

two

mil

Both initiatives require the
help of Spanish-speaking experts
capable of training Venezuelan sol
lion.

diers in the Russification of their

cational and medical

helping the govern
ment train and
organize the new
reservists. Cuban military person

including trips

nel, with their

to

exchanges,
Cuba by

Venezuelans and their relatives for

arsenals and

more

than 40 years

of experience in Russian

military
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country
where conventional, international
financial and trade laws hardly exist,

the need

provides the perfect hiding
place. This explains why Chávez

who make aid conditional

tration with additional

ment.

and

avenues

to

oversight mechanisms on his
government's financial operations.
evade

The Venezuelan

PDVSA,

state owns

the state-oil company that holds
monopoly on oil exports. With

a

net

sales of US$S8 billion in 2004,
PDVSA is the second largest com
next to
pany in Latin America
Mexico's PEMEX and the fifth

state-owned oil company in
the world. Whoever controls
PDVSA controls one of the world's
formidable cash

most

Previous Venezuelan

over

from the

executive branch. Venezuelan law

stipulate

enues

that PDVSNs

be transferred

to

a

rule

anism in

rev

the Central

Bank, and in 1998, Venezuela
ed

creat

mandating a savings mech
times of high oil revenues

(the FIEM). Chávez has under
mined both rules. In addition

failing

to

make the

has selected Havana

quarters for PDVSNs Caribbean
office and for PETROCARIBE,

political

patron who makes
demands.

a

Caribbean energy agree
Chávez has also established

proposed

a

Industrial Bank in Havana
charged with financial intermedia
new

foreign exchange trades
involving everything related to oil
and its derivatives. In September
200S, the president of Venezuela's
tion of

Industrial Bank in Cuba, Luis
Quiaro, reported that the bank's
million.

Chávez

was

conduct

multimillion dollar oil-based
actions away from the

trans

scrutiny

of

obligatory

analysts in Venezuela believe
that the new relationship with Cuba
is disproportionately favorable to
Cuba. This is true, but only in the
Most

term.

Cuba's

new

In the medium term,

relationship

Venezuela hurts Cuba's
For

to
trans

allow the government to
use saved resources, he has eliminat
ed the autonomy of PDVSNs gov
to

Cuba, the

main

with

development

advantage

of

relationship with Venezuela is the
illusion of political autonomy.
Unlike the European Union, which
has provided trade agreements and
its

erning

board.

Cuba since 1993,
Venezuela offers more substantial
and less conditional aid. The aid is

retains

some

more

Yet, PDVSA still
degree of exposure to

bilateral aid

domestic

This autonomy is only short
term, however. In the medium
term, Cuba is heading toward a

degree

of economic

that will

dependence

ultimately hurt

the state's

political autonomy. One of the
enduring insights of the dependency
theorists of the 1970s is that nations

gain control of other nations by
becoming their benefactors. While
the dependencia literature overstated
that
many claims, their basic insight
overreliance

on

external windfalls

development is a
serious proposition. At the
moment, Cuba is suffering from at
least three forms of dependency.
First, Cuba is accumulating a
huge debt with Venezuela. In
February 200S, The Miami Herald
reported Cuba's debt to the country
as US$2. S billion and
rising. It
may reach US$3 billion by mid
and patrons hurts

What Cuba Loses

short

no

can

US$200

can now

Castro,

For

rights.

on

Venezuela represents the perfect
gift: an international

the head

as

to meet

business groups looking for favor
able investment facilities and donors
human

prospects.

fers of PDVSA revenues into the
Central Bank and reforming the
FIEM

Cuba

observers.

presidents

PDVSA. The company had

to

a

international and Venezuelan

cows.

significant independence
used

As

scrutiny.

total control

quite enjoyed

never

tions free of

official line of credit

largest

to

2006, which makes Venezuela
Cuba's top creditor nation, followed
by Japan and Argentina. A lot of
this debt comes from Cuba's issue of

long-term IOUs to PDVSA, defer
ring all payments for at least IS
the original
years, which violates
2000 accord stipulating that no
more than 2So/0 of petroleum
exports

to

Cuba would be financed.

external

substantial because it includes
the lucrative oil deal as well as other
undisclosed state- to-state transfers

the govern
ment to meet its energy and finan
cial needs, the agreements are elimi

international laws and the laws of

that

exempt from scrutiny both
in Cuba and in Venezuela, where

nating

scrutiny. PDVSNs offshore
operations must still comply with
host countries, and its domestic
operations continue to be covered

by the

press, which frequently
reports on PDVSNs irregularities.

Chávez, therefore, needs

a

place

conduct oil-related financial

28

the demands of

training urban
reservists, are a perfect source of
technical advice. Some analysts
even
argue that in organizing its
urban reservists, Chávez is copying
the Territorial Troop Militia, Cuba's
own paramilitary units.
Second, the relationship with
Cuba provides the Chávez adminis

equipment

Hemisphere
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to

transac-

are

accountability of government trans
actions is quickly eroding. It is less
conditional because Cuban
Venezuelan relations involve few

private investments, sparing

Cuba

Second,

by allowing

the incentives the Cuban
government faced in the early 1990s
to develop new sources of revenue.
One

positive

trend of the

Special

Period of the 1990s was that Cuba
began to rethink its economic strat
new areas for investegy,

identifying

Features

ment

and export

the agreements with Cuba

promotion

are enor

exploration), new forms of
business organization (joint ventures

mously unpopular, even among
government sympathizers, precisely
because they appear so dispropor
tionately beneficial to Cuba. This

with international firms, some
forms of self-employment, restruc

discontent is bad for Cuba. It
means that in the event of a change

turing of state-owned enterprises,
legalization of dollars), and new
markets (the European Union). For

of government in Venezuela, the

(tourism, agro-exports, biomedical
services, film/cultural

production,

energy

the first time in decades, Cuba

was

diversify its economic
relations. To use present-day jar
gon, the Cuban state was finally
managing (rather than eschewing)
globalization. The alliance with
Venezuela is eroding the incentives
to stay on this path. It is no coinci
beginning

to

dence that since 2000, Cuba has
allowed the number of foreign ven
and liberalized

tures

sectors to

leaders may want to act on this
discontent and reduce, or possibly

terminate, Venezuela's deals with
Cuba. This possible pulling of the
severe

sidies
into

Revolution,

Castro, this

discontent in both countries. The
departure of so many Cuban doc
as

form of economic loss that the
Cuban government cannot blame

a

embargo. Furthermore,
Cubans cannot help but wonder
why the now legendary apagones
(power outages) across the island
have become increasingly frequent
since 2004, just at around the same
time that Venezuelan oil imports
the US

almost doubled. It is hard for the
government to escape blame for
what
use

seems

to

available

be

a

clear failure

imports

to

for domestic

needs. In turn, most public opin
ion polls in Venezuela reveal that

even

before

they

came

of
power, has been the defense
the island's sovereignty. For Fidel

delaying Cuba's capacity to compete
in today's world economy.
Finally, the Cuba-Venezuela deal
is giving rise to significant political

on

consistent

to

diversified, Venezuela is further

home

most

slogan

seems

to mean

nothing more than maximizing his
personal freedom to rule the island
with no accountability. He has con
stantly searched for some interna
tional patron willing to shower his
government with benefits while

rather than

restricting

government continues to uphold a
personalist view of political sover
real freedom for Cubans will

eignty,

dream.
That Cuba has become
Venezuela's new colony has
a

implica

tions for US-Cuban relations.

give Chávez
leverage during Cuba's

These deals will

enor

post
Castro transition. Venezuela's pres
ence in Cuba is
increasing not only

economically,
The number

but also

militarily.
of Venezuelan military

and

state

dence in Cuba is
The Price of Castro's Sovereignty
and Implications for the US

govern

any state's room for
maneuvering. As long as the Cuban

personnel

depression.

themes of the leaders of the Cuban

self-employment activities, has
banned the use of dollars by
Cubans, and has been complacent
about provoking tensions with
Europe and Mexico, its most
important trading partners. By
making Cuba's economy even less

seen at

Cuba, plunging the island

One of the

on

for Venezuela is

a

to

foreign

expanding

mous

the late 1980s, when Mikhail
Gorbachev abruptly terminated sub

decline, has launched crackdowns

tors

repeat of the
blow that Cuba received in
mean a

one

ends up

ment

remain

new

plug would

market, and

at an

Venezuela's

high.

dor in Havana is

officials in resi
all-time

current
none

ambassa

other than

Adan Chávez, Hugo's brother.
Cuba's future leader will inherit the
and dependence that the

obligations

Castros and Chávezes

are

cultivat

And any regime succession in
Cuba will also occur with signifi

ing.

cant

US involvement-either

by US

acting privately or by gov
ernment
figures carrying out official
policy. The Cuban transition may
even descend into a military con
frontation, possibly involving
citizens

simultaneously allowing him to dic
tate with impunity. Luckily for
him, he has always found one, and

Cuban-Americans, and thus, the

Venezuela is his latest find.

flict, but

While the deals with Venezuela

United States. It is

predict

the

impossible

outcome

of such

we can now

to

a con

be certain that

the Venezuelans will be part of it. II

have been fortunate for Fidel
Castro's local freedom, they repre
sent a
political curse for Cuba. The
deals have eliminated the pressures,
strong in the 1990s, that were push

ing

Cuba

to restructure

its economy

and manage

globalization more
ingeniously. Paradoxically, granting
the Cuban government more politi
cal autonomy has served

to

rein

force rather then lessen its historical

proclivity
cy.

In the

toward

end,

dependency

mono-dependen

Castro should

on one

know,

commodity,
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The End of Rationing?
Carmelo

by

Mesa-Lago

he

rationing

was

system
introduced in

Cuba in 1962 and

gradually expanded in
the following 43 years
to

include

most

food and selected

The economic
crisis that followed the collapse of
the socialist camp led to a drastic
manufactured

goods.

in rationed quotas and, despite
the partial recovery since 1995,
cut

much faster than the domestic pro
duction of consumer goods and the
state's

capacity

allowed

be

to

import

to

set

them: if

by supply

and

demand, prices would have
increased

significantly

and hurt the

rationing monthly quotas in 2005
only met seven to 10 days of food
needs. Surprisingly, at a speech at
the University of Havana in

In
poor and lowest income groups.

November 2005, Fidel Castro
announced that rationing would

all the

soon

February 2006,
Soberón, president

protect these groups the
government fixed prices centrally
and secured minimum quotas for
order

of

Cuba's Central Bank, referred to
that speech and explained that
there is

a

between those who live

only

from

salary, which is insufficient
buy goods at market prices, and
their

to

those who receive non-labor
income (legal such as remittances

as

as

subsidized

prices.

Soberón

remarked that "this is catastrophic
for the nation and economy, and

ethically unacceptable."

He further

stated that the situation has "led
to the
gradual extinction of the

rationing

us

traces

of

the

background

rationing in Cuba, compares
prices in rationed and nonrationed
markets, calculates the purchasing
power of wages and pensions, and
assesses the feasibility of five alter
native strategies to fulfill Castro's

did

avoid

long
of
state shops, and
queues in front
stimulated the emergence and rapid
state,

not

of the black market,
where goods were sold at several
times the rationing price. In the
1970s and the first half of the
1980s, the government fought the
black market by introducing paral
lel official markets,
ant markets, where
were set

by supply

But those

ished

two

during

as

well

prices

as

of

peas

goods

and demand.

markets

were

abol

"Rectification Process" in the

sec

major problem has been that
production of food and other con
sumer
goods, after an increase in
The

the 1970s and 1980s, decreased
sharply during the crisis of the
1990s and
were,

in

by the

end of 2004

most cases,

Volume 17

and tobacco 42%.

tiles 87%

Only

of beans, some vegeta
bles, and tubers was higher in 2004
than in 1989. As a result, the gov
ernment was unable to maintain

production

rationing quotas and cut them so
that by 2005 they only covered
from seven to 10 days of monthly
food needs and considerably less in
manufactured-good needs.
The first three columns of the
table

page 32 show

on

monthly

rationed quotas per person of 20
consumer
goods in Havana in three
years: 1962 at the start of rationing,
in the 1980s before the crisis, and

the end of 2005. In 1962, seven
goods were sold "free" (without
at

quotas)
cut to

but its number had been

four

by the

1980s and

no

goods were sold free in 2005. With
a
couple of exceptions, the quotas
of all goods steadily declined in the
period. Gasoline, cigars, toilet
paper, and beer

were

sold free in

unavailable

1962 but

were

rationing

in 2005; bread

through

was

sold

free in 1962 but restricted to a
small daily roll in 2005, while sugar
went from free to five pounds and

cigarettes from free to three pack
of oil,
ages monthly; the quotas
chicken, tubers, coffee, and deter

the antimarket

below the

out

put level of 1989, for instance: beef

promIse.

Hemisphere

subsidized

ond half of the 1980s.

booklet."

This article

at

expansion

illegal) that allows them to
live comfortably, but both groups
benefit from rationed goods at state

well

people

for the

contradiction in Cuba

63%, fish 65%, sugar 690/0, milk
51 %, eggs 320/0, citrus 22%, tex

to

prices,
in some cases below production
costs. On the positive side,
rationing was an equalizer and wel
fare tool in the midst of scarcity.
On the negative side, it was costly

end. In

Francisco
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Inception and Evolution of
Rationing
The official justification for
rationing was that the population's
purchasing power had increased

gent shrank between 50% and
750/0. Rationed milk is only sold to
children age seven and younger or
adults under a medically-prescribed
diet (one liter daily). It used to be
sold also

elderly people (six cans
of condensed or evaporated milk
monthly) but was discontinued in
the early 1990s. Butter is not avail
able through rationing and potatoes
to

Features

need the

Despite the rhetoric, Cubans
government dole

A person holds

out a

food rationing

booklet while

standing in

line

at a

government

store

survive

to

in the province

of Pinar del Rio.

self-employment, and the
introduction of state hard-currency
shops ("shoppings" or TRD) open
to nationals. By 2004 about 620/0
of the population received dollar

market

remittances from relatives and

circulation of the dollar

friends abroad that

banned;

survived the severe
cut in rationed quotas thanks to the
government reforms implemented

Cubans

dollars into "convertible" Cuban

in 1993-96 that allowed the circu

self-employment, family restau
rants, dollar incentives paid under
the-table to employees in joint ven
tures, and speculation in the black

are

the

only

tuber

and

occasionally

offered. The quota of beef was
three pounds in 1962 but in 2005
the quota

was a

half pound for

beans, and

mixture of

ground

meat; very

few medicines

obtainable in

The

state

soy,

are

pharmacies.

people

foreign

remit

in that currency, the

resur

lation of the dollar,
tances

a

rection of free

agricultural

markets

to

permitted
buy goods in agricultural

markets and TRD. Income and
access

to

these markets

came

from

or

the informal

Nevertheless,

a new

sector.

antimarket

that started in 2003 and con
tinued in 2006 reversed the most

wave

important

pesos

a

was

reform

measures:

fee of 10%

was

to

imposed (two

culate in the island: the

The

change
pesos cir

regular

and

the "convertible" whose value is not
set in the international market but

arbitrarily by
rate

the government

of 24 pesos

to

buy

one

Hemisphere

at a

convert-

Volume 17

31

Features

Monthly Quotas of Rationed Goods per Person in Havana (1962, 1980s, 2005)
and Prices in Regular Pesos at Rationed and Non-rationed Markets (2005)
Rationed

Goods

Beef, mixed with
Chicken

soy

(pound)

(pound)

Quotas (years)

Prices in

Regular

Pesos

(2005)

1962

1980s

2005

Rationing

Agriculture

TRD

3

1

0.50

0.80

No

43-215

3

2

1

0.70

No

29-53

Fish

(pound)

1

Free

0.688

0.70

No

68-135

Rice

(pound)

6

5

5

0.25

4-5

11-14

1.5

1.25

1.875

0.40

8-20

30-40

14

5

4

0.40

2-4

No

2

1.5

0.50

0.20

10-18

54

5

Free

8

0.15

1-2

2-3

6

3

O

No

6

64

Free

Free

30

0.05

10

No

Sugar (pound)

Free

6

5

0.10-0.15

No

16-22

Coffee (pound)

1

0.375

0.25

5.00

No

145-158

Cigarettes (package)

Free

4

3

2-2.50

No

9-57

Cigars (unit)

Free

4

O

No

No

Vary

Gasoline

Free

10

O

No

No

73-86

2

1.5

1

0.20-0.25

No

8

1

0.5

0.25

0.90

No

24

Free

1

O

No

No

26

1

1

1

0.65

No

60

Free

Free

O

No

No

20-26

(pound)

Beans

Tubers

Lard

(pound)

(pound)

and soy oil (liter)

Eggs (units)
Milk

(liter, powder

Bread

(roll)

Bath

or

in

TRD)

(gallon)

wash soap

(tablet)

Detergent (bottle)
Toilet paper

(roll)

Tooth paste (small tube)
Beer

(national,

bottle

or

can)

Espinosa Chepe and a researcher who requested anonymity, as well as articles in
Havana internet, December 2005 and January 2006. TRD prices in convertible pesos have been estimated in regular pesos at the current
official exchange rate of 24 to one. "No" means that the good is not offered in a given market.
NOTE: Data
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($16.70

at

the official

exchange

rate

dollar), the min
imum wage 225 pesos ($11.25), the
average monthly pension 180 pesos
($9), and the minimum received by
half of the pensioners 150 pesos
($7.50). The whole basket of
of 20 pesos per

one

rationed

for the first

10

days

goods

of the month

seven to

only
but monthly elec
costs

about 30 pesos,
tricity rates adds 10to 20 pesos, bus
20 pesos (one
10to 20 pesos), and

12

transportation
taxi drive

costs

to

and water eight to 10 pesos;
the bulk of the population owns a

phone

pays 100/0 of
salary, an average of 33 pesos; the
total ranges from 60 to 115 pesos.

dwellingbut

Food and other

goods unavailable through the rationing system can be purchased
at
hard-currency shops) or TRDs) such as the one pictured above. But for an over
whelming majority of Cubans-who cannot afford to shop at the TRD-the mea
ger basket of rationed food and goods is essential for their survival.

minority

a

With the income left, everyone
buy food unavailable through

rationing

agricultural
the remaining
at

TRD for
of the month,

as

well

and manufactures
ible peso in 2005); the convertible

the ratios of nonrationed

appreciated by 8% (pro
portionally reducing the value of the
dollar); the number of self-employed
activities and family restaurants was
reduced; controls over agricultural
markets were tightened, and TRD
prices were raised between 10% and

prices, for instance,

peso

30%

was

and

them in convertible

set

fish,

to

rationed

100 times in

200 times in bread and 92

times in

toothpaste;

18 and 52

first between
rationing and agricultural market
prices and the second between
times in rice

(the

rationed and TRD prices), and 90
and 270 times in oil. Furthermore,

not

as

must

markets
20-23

or

days

other food

available

through rationing at all. That is
impossible to minimum and average
pensioners, as well as minimum
wage earners, without foreign remit
tances, family help, or extra income
(many pensioners sell stuff in the
streets or

do similar tasks).

With

what is left, average salary earners
can buy about one-half of their
needs

remaining food

agricultural
One pound
at

pesos (thus adding another 10%
increase due to the exchange fee for

many rationed items

and TRD markets.

months

each of beef, chicken, and fish, four

the

quality

of rationed and

some nonra

pounds

tioned

goods

has

deteriorated:

beans, two onions, one bottle of soy
oil, and four eggs cost 213 pesos

dollar).

measures, as

of the

result of these
well as the tightening

As

a

embargo by the

istration, the
and the

declined

amount

access to

sharply

Bush admin

of remittances

goods

in TRD

in 2005.

Prices in Rationed and Non

Rationed Markets and
Power of the

Purchasing

People

The last three columns of the
table compare prices in regular pesos
of goods in rationed and nonra
tioned markets

TRD)

(agricultural

and

in Havana in December

2005. There

are

huge

differences in

disappear for
(soap, detergent) and the
badly

beef has been substituted

by a

of rice,

two

pounds

of

ground

mixture of soy, beans, and
meat; rationed rice is small and of

two-thirds of the average wage.
Additional essential toiletries bought

bad

at

potatoes are often rot
ten; fish is small and full of bones;
bath soap lacks perfume and easily

quality;

disintegrates; the rationed bottle of
detergent is only good for washing
dishes, a bag of powder from TRD
must be bought for
washing clothes;
shoes break after

a

few months of

use.

The average monthly wage at the
end of 2005 was 334 regular pesos

the TRD

(one

bag of detergent

each soap tablet,
and deodorant bot

84 pesos, one-fifth of the
average salary; a pound of ham or a

tle)

costs

pressure cooker

wipes out almost
half of the monthly average wage or
the whole minimum pension, and a
light bulb bought at a TRD takes
30% of the average wage and 500/0
of the average pension. Many cars
are

immobilized because spare parts,

Hemisphere
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only available in TRD, are highly
priced or because a gallon of gaso
line takes 22%

of the average

Feasibility of Five Alternative
Strategies to End Rationing
All of the above shows that, as
insufficient as the meager basket of
rationed food and

goods is,

a

few manufac

it is essential for the

survival of the immense majority of
Cubans. According to the govern
ment,

the basket of rationed foods

con
guarantees half of the daily
sumption of calories although it

actually covers one third at best. In
is
any case, the intriguing question
how rationing could be terminated?
Five potential strategies to tackle
that problem are evaluated below.
The logical way to eliminate
rationing would be to increase the
supply of consumer goods either
through domestic production,
imports, or a combination of both.
This alternative is unfeasible in
Cuba in the mid term for various
reasons:

2005

domestic

was

production

in

below the 1989 level in

goods (see above)
population has grown 7%

most consumer

and the

in the last 16 years;

imports

of food

significantly increased in the
last three years, mostly from the
United States, but still are grossly
have

people
everywhere, generating the
longest queues under the revolu
tion, and unleashing a potentially
volatile political situation, all of
which makes this alternative highly
improbable.
be

set

afflict from 20%

to

total

to

cal record).
its present restrictions,
the government could terminate the

Accepting

booklet but maintain the
subsidized prices, eliminate

rationing
current

the
lies

compulsory adscription of fami
to the neighborhood state gro

cery, and free

consumers to

pur

existing limited goods
anywhere they are offered. This
chase the

Hemisphere
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markets and TRD. Such action,
however, would be harmful to the
middle-income group, particularly
those who do not receive remit
In order

tances.

to

compensate

increases of average

population), precisely the jus

tification that the government gave
to introduce rationing back in

1962. In addition, it would

signifi

inequality of food
access in favor of the highest
income group and provoke severe
nutritional deficiencies in a large
part of the population. In view of
cantly expand

the

current

tive are

the

official criticism of

inequalities,

chances of this alterna

consequences

nario.

in the

as

elimination of

significant jump in state
budget expenditures, and probably
in monetary liquidity and inflation.
Still, that largesse was grossly insuf

voked

a

ficient

to

improve

food

access

of

these vulnerable groups (as shown
above); further increases in social

extremely costly
and provoke
instability.
Finally, rationing could be restrict

welfare would be

financial

ed

to

the poor and lowest income

would

cost

In view of the lack of easy alterna

tives, Fidel's

announcement

of the

might well be
another symbolic ingredient in the
official discourse aimed at getting

end of rationing

support for the

ongoing

economic

recentralization process, the

paign against corruption,
assure

cam

and

to

people that the
the right track with

the Cuban

revolution is

on

bright future ahead. Such prom
ise, along with abundant energy in
a

promises

made

by

per

penSIons,

sce

analysis.

lowest income groups to allow them
to purchase goods at market prices.

rrurumum

to

600 million pesos, a flagrant under
estimation based on the previous

could be combined with an increase
of social assistance to the poor and

wages,

previous

rationing

Leader have done

mum

leading
stability

Castro estimated that the

many other
the Maximum

2006, could go astray

poor.

previous alternative, however,

The

wages would be necessary,

670/0 of the

and social assistance; but the cost of
2 billion pesos (100/0 of GDP) pro

merchandise trade deficit in
2005 surpassed $4 billion, a histori

to

similar adverse fiscal and

to

the needed additional quantities

(the

purchase goods at prices
set by supply and demand, with
supplemental buying at agricultural
ulation

by supply and
demand, and let those people who
have enough money to buy the lim
ited goods sold at considerably
higher prices. This strategy would
badly harm the poor and lowest
income groups (poverty is estimated
prices

of the pop

rest

them, further

The government seemed to take
this path in 2005 by raising mini

to

groups and leave the

The government could also abol
ish the rationing booklet but allow

compensate for the
and Cuba
poor domestic output
lacks convertible currency to buy
insufficient

34

create

for food

monthly wage.

tured

chaos because produc
tion and services would be disrupt
abandon jobs to hunt
ed as

would

years: the

capita

so

as

in the past 47

industrial output
in Latin America and a

largest

fourfold increase in milk

production

by 1965; a sugar harvest of 10 mil
lion tons and the creation of an
unselfish "New Man" in 1970; and
a

fourfold

jump

in nickel output,

a

world power in biotechnology, and
food self-sufficiency in the 1980s. II

Mesa-Lago is Distinguished
Service Professor Emeritus of econom
Carmelo

ics and Latin American studies

at

the

University ofPittsburgh and was visit
ing professor at FlUfrom 1999 to
2003.

New from the

Press

University of North Carolina

War and Genocide in

...

1895- 1898

Cuba,

War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898 by John Lawrence Tone
takes as its focal point the Cuban war for independence from Spain
the United States' entry into the conflict in 1 898. Tone con
tends that the events in Cuba before American intervention are par
adigmatic of warfare in Latin America and elsewhere in the 19th and

prior

to

ultimately more interesting than the "splen
did little war" of 1898. Employing Spanish and Cuban sources to
recover the experiences of civilians and common soldiers during
wartime, the author takes a fresh look at well-known figures such as
José Martí, Máximo Gómez, Valeriano Weyl,er, and Antonio
Cávanos and contributes to ongoing historiographical debates
20th centuries and

.

are

the attitudes of its participants, the methods
of combat, and the necessity of US involvement to defeat Spain.
about the nature of

war,

his careful examination of the

Through

and Cuban positions
answers to old questions

Spanish

prior to US involvement, Tone offers new
concerning the attitudes of the Cuban people toward the
War and Genocide in

Cuba,

J895-J898

by

John Lawrence Tone

352 pp., 8

illustrations, 4 tables,

3 maps, notes, bibliography, index
ISBN 0-8078-3006-2

$35 hardcover
Publication Date: March 13, 2006
University of North Carolina Press

"Tone deals with not

aspects

of

the

only

the

military

political complexities

The

of those

coun

and the social and economic
which the story unfolds.
author's narrative technique

backdrop

on

makes for easy reading, with some
chapters centered around the per
sonal life of
ters in

one

of the main charac

the drama and other
and social

political
military history.
on

war as

well

as a war

and

of lib

of "reconcentration,"
which called for the forcible relocation of thousands of Cubans to
concentration camps, raising the question of whether this policy con

policy

represented an acceptable level of
violence toward a civilian population within the standard rules of
engagement. In addition, Tone examines how Spaniards and
Cubans fought one another, challenges the widely held notion that
the Cuban's had defeated Spain before the US declared war, and
explores the necessity of US intervention.
stituted

genocide

or

whether it

Cuban-Spanish

American war, but also the internal
tries

the ways in which the conflict was a civil
eration. Tone also explores the Spanish

war

chapters
problems or

Tone masters all of

these fields."
-José Alvarez Junco
Centro de Estudios Políticos y
Constitucionales, Madrid

single chapter in the
the 1898 conflict, involving participants
longer war
who hailed from Havana, Madrid, and the Cuban countryside. His
approach depends greatly on newly released evidence from Spanish
government and military archives, including hospital records that tell
a different story about how battles were fought; intercepted Cuban
letters that reveal the war's effect on civilians; battle diaries kept by
commanders on both sides that cast new light on the condition of
the troops; and administrative records that provide fresh insight into
the tragedy of reconcentration.
Tone treats the

"splendid
that preceded

little war"

as

but

a

complete story, Tone fleshes out the existing nar
rative of the war for Cuban independence and underscores the com
plexity of the issues that lay at the heart of the conflict.
By telling this

more

John Lawrence Tone is Associate Professor of

Georgia

Institute of

Technology.

History

at

the

Everything
by

Uva de

change,

means

radical

then the Cuban

Revolution has lived up to its
name-but only in part.
Since its earliest

days

in

1959, the leaders of the Revolution

proclaimed a new future for Cuba,
even
insisting on creating el hombre
nuevo.
Along with the call for rev
bury

the exhortation

was

what

was

considered

to

an

igno

minious past: the Catholic Church,
tourism and its ills, bourgeois soci

ety and values, and class and racial
disparities. The Revolution's intent
different social,
and economic order has

to create a

radically

political,
certainly succeeded. Cuba today is
a fundamentally different country
than it

45 years ago.

was

Yet, almost five decades after
Fidel Castro marched triumphantly
into Havana at the head of his
rebel army, Cuba remains a coun
try virtually frozen in time. The
pervasive winds of revolution have
blow away deep
rooted beliefs and traditions.
Cubans cling to the past both
not

managed

to

physically and emotionally. From
antique cars to old wives tales,
from yellowed family photos to
I

momentary recollection of the

glamour and genteelness of a
bygone era, the new men and
women

of Cuba

seem

greater comfort in old
memories, than in the
elusive

new

Cuba

to

find

customs

automobiles and late-model

campaigns, slogans,

European and Japanese cars to car
riages pulled by horses and the
odd-looking camellos. Within the
same block one can contemplate
the renovated splendor of Havana's
magnificent colonial architecture,
as well as crumbling buildings.
Tourists and natives can easily be
distinguished from one another by
the way they dress, the places they
visit, and where they eat. A new
luxury hotel can suddenly sprout
in the countryside, a short distance

is

and
away from old "bohíos"

hoped

clotheslines

Cuba is

and

hope of the
once
promised to

country of
visitor to the
a

con

Any
island will immediately see its myr
iad forms of transportation: from
shiny, as if new, old American
Hemisphere

Volume 17

draped

with colorful

sheets, underwear, and T-shirts.
But, the contradictions run deeper
than what the eye can
that have suffered the
ration for years

now

see.

Families

pain

of sepa

communicate

a

place

and decrees. It

that has suffered isolation

from the world, but, yet, the signs
of modernity are starting to appear,
albeit slowly. In its essence, how
ever,

Cuba

clings

than embrace

an

the past rather
elusive future.
to

Even that effervescent and

hopeful

time when the Revolution

was

infancy

renewed

is

not

today

in Cuba is

precisely

the past that the Revolution had
to

bury.

diction in the
The
taken

One

new

more contra

old Cuba.

following photographs were
during several trips to the

2005 and
hope to capture, much better than
these words, the paradoxes of life
island from 2002

to

in Cuba. II

and remittances, and the internet
are
healing the wounds and forging

the Cuban Research Institute

stronger ties among relatives.
While the US travel restrictions
implemented in 2005 have had a

negative

effect

it

to a

on

they

this

have

family rec
not
brought

Cuba, of course, is

not

entirely

frozen in time. It is also a country
of constant change, for the govern
ment reacts

Uva de

Aragón

is associate director

with continuous

new

of

at

Florida International University. A
prolific writer, she has published several books

on

literary

criticism, poet

and a novel,
ry, short stories, essays,
Memoria del silencio. Her most
recent

work is Morir de exilio,

lished June 2006.

halt.

in

part of the collec
tive memory of young Cubans.
The irony is that what is being
its

bye-mail, and even collaborate in
creating family trees or sharing web
pages. Family visits, care packages

onciliation,

tradictions.
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Again

to eradicate the
efforts
Despite
past, its appeal is palpable in the
Cuba of today

even

them.

Today,

Old Is New

y

A

s

s

Aragón

f revolution

olution

E

o

T

o

H

p

pub

Photo

Essay

A billboard in Havana with the

images of revolutionary figure
Camilo Cienfuegos, student leader
Julio Antonio Mella, and the iconic
Ché Guevara-all of whom
violent
better

deaths-promises
world is possible.

met

that

a

I
I

/'

Cubans have learned

perform

keep their old American
running. This one, parked in

miracles
cars

to

to

Centro Habana, shines like

A cochero awaits

new.

to

transport
tourists in his horse and carriage
around Old Havana. The
tion of old

the

buildings
background.

can

renova

be

Hemisphere
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in

Vólume 17

37

Photo

Essay

Havana's Café de Oriente, an ImI
tation of the famous Madrid land

mark,

caters to

tourists. The

Cuban government started to wel
come visitors to the island as part
of its modest economic reforms of
the mid 90s. Jobs serving tourists
are
highly coveted.

Prices in this small coffee

shop

Centro Habana

in

are more

with the meager salaries of
Cubans.

At the hotel Los

in

tune

most

Jazmines, adjacent

the Valle de Viñales in Matanzas,
Cubans can enjoy the restaurant
to

and other facilities, but are forbid
den to stay at the hotel, even if they
can

38
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pay for it.

Photo

Essay

Not far from the luxury hotel, there
are indications that life in Cuba's

countryside
icantly.

has

not

changed signif

I
I

Tourists walk
stone streets

through

the cobble

of Old Havana.

With the

passing of time, the
promise of an egalitarian society has
become elusive. Beggars can again
be

seen

in the

streets

of Havana.
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7

Photo

Essay

Since 1997, when the government
allowed Christmas to be celebrated

again, families immediately
started to display their old trees,
ornaments, and nativity sets, which
once

had been hidden for decades.

;

/,

/

Amelia

Goyri

de Adot

buried

was

in this tomb in the Cementerio de

Colón when she died

during

child

Legend has it that
when the casket was opened years
later, the body was in tact and
Amelia was holding the baby in her
arms. According to the popular
myth, "La Milagrosa," as she is
known, has special healing powers,
and is particularly helpful to moth
birth in 1901.

ers

and their children. Her tomb is

always adorned by flowers
notes

and

from devoted visitors.

Young Cubans, dressed in jeans,
stroll by a mural in Old Havana
depicting distinguished 19th centu
ry Cuban

men

and

women

of let

ters.
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is said that after

larly

heated

particu
exchange with
a

Neville Chamberlain,
Winston Churchill vowed
that

will

"History

not

be kind

Neville Chamberlain. I know
because I'm going to write it."

cautious with Latell's

chologistic

slant

biography than macro-socio
logical analysis on the shelves.
Joining this trend toward critical
biography is Brian Latell's After

and modus

operandi as

more

Fidel. Latell has been for decades

analyst on Cuba,
"fascinated" (his word) since his
graduate student days with Cuban
the senior CIA

On his

admis

to

communism.

And, he did indeed write it solidify

sion, this book has been in the oven
since at least 1986. Given his long

ing, perhaps

for

ever

after, the

ciation between clichéd

asso

portrayals

of "Chamberlain" and "Munich."
Will

history

be kind

to

Castro and his revolution
its

47th year?

tendency

It is

a

now

to

in

fact that the
be

increasingly

critical of the path taken. And yet,
the fascination with the revolution's
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own

with the CIA, his access to
recently released ex-Soviet files, and
career

his

acquaintance

with the

good

read. That said,

a

has

to

is the

on

heavily psy
Castro's style
well

as

his

Raúl, which, let it be said,

most

important

contribution

of the book.
Latell is quite persua
sive when he argues that in Castro
we have a classical case of the child
being father to the man. Presented
To be

sure,

illegitimate Fidel in an
early and single-minded-even
obstinate-struggle to overcome
this family shame and a myriad of
here is the

other obstacles

social and educa
The end result of

to

mobility.

"pariah"

to overcome

his

deep-rooted
personality. Listen to

status was a

authoritarian

Latell:

terrific

one

on

the many battles

hefty volumes on Castro,
one was expecting a ponderous
encyclopedia-like tome. What he
finally delivered, rather, is a fast
paced and elegantly written
account, in every way

take

tional

recent

slew of

Fidel

among non-Cuban

authors has been

42

charismatic leader continues
unabated. On balance, there is

be

The survival skills that Fidel began
develop as a child being on his
-

to

Review Forum

A review essay

Cuba

"

(18). Rather, we can piece
alternative interpretation from

luck
an

on

...

occasional concessions the author
makes

to

Fidel's

"exceptional

intelli

gence" (38) and to his total dedica
tion to understanding US politics
so as to thwart it at every turn.
"With the

exception of a

succession

of Israelj.leaders," says Latell, "there

probably no other political figure
anywhere in the world who has
been more knowledgeable in assess
ing American politics and accurate
in predicting American gyrations"
is

T

C ban

e

the

t

I. 1

b lorg

of the

ta

Twenty-Fir
Edit

Economy
t

(69). Thus,

Cen ury

mmgu z; Ornar E orlen
and Loren B rberi

P

rez

not a

what

we

have here is

leader divorced from

but rather

\ illanueva

his chosen

reality

fixed

on
inflexibly
path and determined to

one

devote his considerable talents to
short-circuit any and all attempts

Clearly not an adver
sary to be taken lightly which, one
suspects, is precisely what the US
consistently did.
That there have been no major
US leaders equally dedicated to a
deep understanding of Cuban poli
tics and gyrations is evident in the
tightly argued book by Don
Bohning. Writing in the straight
forward, unadorned style of the
journalist, Bohning makes extensive
use of
newly unclassified materials
stopping

guard, fearing betrayal and rejection)
improvising solutions) seizing initia
tives) trusting almost no one) threat
ening and committing acts of vio
lence) and relying on his instincts
rather than waiting for fate to be
dealt him

through

-

the

have carried
rest

over

of his life (53).

Fidel could have held power so long
without Raúl's steady control of the
armed forces" (21). After Fidel,
Latell predicts, it will be Raúl who
will have the occasion and the
capacity to set the revolution in
more

rational and

(with

the US)

a

conciliatory

course.

problem with the author's
psychological approach to both
The

None of this of

What is

new

and

course,

personality

new.

interesting

way Latell compares and

Fidel's

is

is the

contrasts

with that of his

younger brother Raúl. Also born

out-of-wedlock and without any of
the attractive physical and social
attributes of Fidel, Raúl emerges
from these pages as the more stable
and dependable of the two. As

linchpin" of Fidel's
succession strategy, the "guarantor"
of political stability in Cuba. "It is
highly unlikely," says Latell, "that
such, he

is "the

Fidel and Raúl is that it does not
explain why and how a leader (in

at

to

him.

describe what he calls "one of

sustained, and

Fidel) variously described
as
"paranoid" (49, 51), operating
under a "permanent link" with a

the

"fantasy world of historical heroes"
(59), "vain, spoiled and narcissistic"
(84), in short, a "sociopath" (89),
managed to out-maneuver the

government of another in the post
World War II era" (1). He skillfully
dissects the eight known CIA plots

world's greatest power for over four
decades. We can disregard Latell's

1960 and 1965

this

case,

throw-away explanation that
has had "exceptionally good

Fidel

most

extensive

ultimately futile covert action
grams by one country against

to

pro

the

assassinate Fidel Castro between
as

well

as

the

bringing about
popular uprisings, including the
disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion.
broader attempts

at
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Two of

conclusions

Bohning's

are

worthy of reflection 40 years after
all the plots and destabilization
concludes
attempts. First, Bohning
that on restudy, it is difficult to see
"how grown men could have taken
(all these anti-Castro plans) serious
ly" (8). Secondly, and here one

developmen

tal frustration. This is, of course,
revelation. Decades ago,
socialist friends of Cuba, such as
René Dumont, K. S. Karol, and
not a new

Charles Bettelheim, bemoaned the
voluntaristic and often hare-brained

cannot

schemes of the Cuban leader.
Today, the view that such schemes

sober CIA

have for four decades fallen short of
their goals seems to be the consid

help but think of the Iraq
fiasco, Bohning records how the
assessments

of the

regime's strengths and its
urgent counsels against excessive
optimism about impending implo
Castro

sions of the system

were

consistent

ly ignored by the political leader
ship.
Bohning ends by quoting a CIA
report from 1963 which argued
that US programs at their present
levels were not likely, barring
unforeseen events such as the sud

ered view of

The

enormous

most

the record of the US "obsession,"
Bohning concludes that the Cl.A's

1963

assessment

"remained valid

than four decades later"
(263). This "obsession" with the

more

reasoning and intentions
obviously not produced strate

leader's
has

gies

to

defeat,

or at

least neutralize,

that leader. Latell, however,
believes that the focus on Fidel is
essential
that

even

though

dealing with,

the economy was
have been easier"

he confesses

(184).

now? Not if the books

Domínguez,

Would it

Pérez Villanueva and

the

part in Cuba's economic
failures, it is mostly the same "rea
soning and intentions" of Fidel
a

Castro, which bedeviled Latell (and
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account

for

is

needed

urgently

through increased competi
tion and appropriate incentives.
They all agree that the existing nat
ciencies

ural

and,

resources

as

economy is exhausted

Pérez Villanueva puts

"physically

run

down"

66). "The traditional

a

second

based

one

econo

Triana.
woman,

reforms

implemented

these

in the

early

confront the dis
of the economy fol

to

astrous

collapse

lowing

the removal of Soviet subsi
economy

foreign investment, the restruc
turing of foreign trade, the conse
tourist
quences of an expanding
to

sector,

and the free circulation of

hard currency.
Arguing well within the

(Domínguez,
model-sup

on

decentral

self-financing with
new economic actors" (67). This
was of course before Fidel dropped
the guillotine on that decentralized
ized models of

So,

one

has

Cuba listens

again

to

ideologi

cal parameters of the socialist state
they all appear to support, there is

Certainly

Fidel Castro. He
in 1971,

a

very

to

ask: Who in

their best economic

formal economic

and

it,

ported by antiquated methods and
already obsolete administrative
practices," he says, "exists alongside

Alfredo Gonzalez Gutierrez,
Hidiam Marquette, and Juan
a man

changed

property relations,
of economic decision-making, and
the promoting of production effi

thinkers?

To

are

decentralization

Everleny Pérez
Villan ueva (two essays), Pedro
Monreal, Jorge Mario Sánchez
Egozcue, Mayra Espina Prieto,
Viviana Togores, and Anicia Garda.
Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López analyze
the work of most of these, plus
those of other outstanding Cuban
economists such as Julio Carranza,

dies, the opening of the

fact that while external factors (fun
damentally the US embargo) have

his US bosses), that

by the

mists, i.e. Omar

1990s in order

by

Barberia, and Mesa-Lago and

played

some

that the reforms of the
1990s did not go far enough in
restructuring the economy. What

consensus

model.

reader is that it

economists deal with the economic

"would

Pérez-López are good measures.
Although both books attest to

value of the

solid essays
outstanding of these

includes

for instance, how

faring

of

"dependency" paradigms and
language of the 1960s and 1970s,
they show a solid grasp of modern
developmental economics and of
the global realities, which present
real challenges to all countries,
including their own.

Communist

and

generation

and

Domínguez

regime. Having care
dispassionately reviewed

a new

Cuban economists. Eschewing the
tired old Marxist, "world system"

den death of Castro, to result in the
early overthrow of the Castro

fully
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five decades of

nearly

not

never

President

has.

sympathetic

Writing
US

economist, Bertrand Silverman,
noted that in Cuba the economy
was
being directed by "individuals
without previous experience, tech
nical know-how, or reliable infor
mation." Even where there was a
team

in

place,

Silverman noted, Fidel Castro made
all final decisions through a parallel
apparatus (Bertrand
Silverman, Man and Socialism in

planning

Cuba [1971], p. 22). This contin
ues to be his modus
operandi:
reforms

are

implemented only

when circumstances force

a

sort

of

necessity" only to be uncer
emoniously pulled back as soon as
relief is in sight. Sustaining "social
ist morality" is invariably the justifi
cation. That sustained develop
ment is impossible under such cir
cumstances is made evident by
Jorge Domínguez. In a succinct
analysis of the gains and deficien"law of

Review Forum

cies of the reforms of the 1990s,

and

argues that "Several of
Cuba's economic reforms were only

Domínguez

partial. Partial reform equilibrium
is a long-term recipe for disaster; it
delays micro economic reforms
indefinitely" (Domínguez, 41).
And, this

was

draconian
liberalism"
in

written before the

"neo

against
pushed by Fidel

measures

Castro

November, 2005.

Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López note
this cycle of on-again off-again
attempts at reform and leave no
doubts as to where the problem

eventually reversed pro-market
policies and launched anti-market
cycles actions certain to bring about
adverse economic performance is
the fear of losing political control as a
result: decentralization of economic
policymaking, expansion of the mar
ket the private sector, and the subse
-

-

quent surge in economic behavior
independent of the state. Political

.

lies:
As of
We believe that the

the

core reason

leadership limited,

why

closed down)

New from the

now

it appears that Latell's

Press

his

to

economists any more than his
brother did? It is most intriguing

that Latell seems to be betting that
he will. Those in the US adminis
tration still "obsessed" with a "clean
transition" in Cuba better read his

Anthony Maingot is Professor
Emeritus of S6ciology at Florida
International University. His most
recent
py,blication (with Wilfredo
Lozano)

biographical approach to the politi
cal and economic history of the

University of North Carolina

becomes: Will Raúllisten

book. III

logic) therefore) has trumped econom
ic logic) even though the results have
been the deterioration of economic
conditions and standard ofliving.
(xii-xiii)

Cuban revolution "under Fidel"
will be vindicated. The question

is The United States and

the Caribbean: Transforming
Hegemony and Sovereignty
(Routledge 2004).
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THE ORIGINS OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION RECONSIDERED

by

Samuel Farber

Analyzing the crucial period of the Cuban Revolution from 1959 to 1961, Samuel Farber challenges dominant scholarly
and popular views of the revolution's sources, shape, and historical trajectory. Unlike many observers, who treat Cuba's
revolutionary leaders as having merely reacted to US policies or domestic socioeconomic conditions, Farber shows that rev
olutionary leaders, while acting under serious constraints, were nevertheless autonomous agents pursuing their own inde
pendent ideological visions, although not necessarily according to a master plan.
Exploring

how historical conflicts between US and Cuban interests colored the reactions of both nations' leaders after the

overthrow of

Fulgencio Batista,

Farber argues that the

century made the island ripe for radical social and
vide

early

assistance.

rative literature

Taking advantage

from Cuba, Farber focuses

rnulticlcss, antidictatorial
'� first-rate

Batista
is

a

synthesis

regime

of

movement in to

and

a

structure

economic

recently

of Cuba's

change,

interpretation

declassified US and Soviet documents

three

of the Cuban

as

in the first half of the 20th

well

It is

as

how the Cuban rebellion

revolutionary experience--both

and the consolidation of power in 1959-60.

major contribution

politics

and the ascendant Soviet Union

key years to explain
full-fledged social revolution.

on

economy and

intelligent,

was on

hand

to pro

biographical and nar
rapidly evolved from a

the rebellion

well written, and well

against

organized

the
..

.it

to the field of Cuban studies."
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